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Don't TREAD on Me:
Faster Than a Tire Blowout, Congress Passes
Wide-Sweeping Legislation That Treads on




In the wake of one of the most controversial recalls ever
to strike the automotive industry, and in its haste to act
through the passage of some legislation, indeed almost any
legislation that could be marketed as "pro-consumer" in
time for use in the upcoming elections, the 106th Congress
passed the Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act on
October 11, 2000, which President Clinton signed into law
on November 1, 2000.1
The TREAD Act amends the National Traffic and Motor
Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 ("Vehicle Safety Act") in response
to unanswered questions surrounding the (lack of) reporting
of potential defect information that led to the recall of over
fourteen million Bridgestone/Firestone ATX, ATX II, and
Wilderness AT tires on August 9, 2000. Prior to this recall,
numerous complaints on file with National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration (NHTSA) had alleged
f Staff Attorney, Volkswagen of America, Inc. Dr. iur. (Doctor of Legal
Sciences), University of the Saarland School of Law and Business Sciences,
Germany; LL.M.Eur. (Master of European Law), Institute of European Studies,
University of the Saarland, Germany; J.D., Washington University School of
Law; B.A., Kalamazoo College. The views and opinions written in this article
are current through August 15, 2001 (unless otherwise noted) and reflect those
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or Audi or any of their employees. Copyright © 2001 Kevin M. McDonald. All
rights reserved.
1. Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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that the Firestone tires, which Ford Motor Company (Ford)
mounted as standard equipment on Ford Explorers,
suffered tread separation causing vehicle rollover that
culminated in death or serious bodily injury. Congress was
distraught to learn that Ford failed to notify NHTSA of the
numerous tire-related safety campaigns conducted by Ford
in overseas markets and the numerous lawsuits filed
against Bridgestone/Firestone. Even more distressing to
Congress was that, while Ford was required to notify
NHTSA of safety campaigns conducted in the United
States, Ford was not required under law to report the very
same safety campaigns conducted in overseas markets.
This article examines the TREAD Act's massive impact
on the thirty-five year old Vehicle Safety Act. Part I
(Background) traces the origins of the Vehicle Safety Act of
1966 before turning to the Ford-Firestone tire recall events,
which ultimately culminated in high profile congressional
hearings and eventual passage of the TREAD Act in
October 2000. Part II (Analysis) focuses on the text and
impact of the TREAD Act, in particular, the impact both on
NHTSA and the automotive industry. Further, Part II
points out major differences between the Senate and House
versions and offers suggestions for NHTSA to consider as it
undertakes numerous rulemaking activities implementing
the TREAD Act. The article concludes by focusing on issues
NHTSA will need to address as it undertakes to implement
the numerous TREAD Act mandates.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act2 is
the basic motor vehicle safety statute administered by the
NHTSA.3 The purpose of the Vehicle Safety Act, originally
2. Pub. L. No. 89-563, 80 Stat. 718 (1966) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 30101-30169).
3. Although the Vehicle Safety Act specifically empowers the Secretary of
the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Secretary has delegated much of
its authority to NHTSA's Administrator pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1.50 (2000). See
49 C.F.R. § 501.2 (1995) (delegating authority to NHTSA to "carry out" Vehicle
Safety Act). NHTSA has more than 600 employees with a $403 million annual
budget. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Dr. Jeffery W. Runge Becomes
12th National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator, (Aug. 3, 2001), available
at http://www.dot.gov/affairs.nhtsa4201.htm. The current (twelfth) NHTSA
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passed in 1966, "is to reduce traffic accidents and deaths
and injuries resulting from traffic accidents."4 With more
than 40,000 fatalities per year, traffic accidents are the
leading cause of death for Americans in their mid-thirties
and younger.'
To effectuate the purpose of "reduc[ing] traffic
accidents," the Department of Transportation (DOT) is
authorized "to prescribe motor vehicle safety standards for
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment in interstate
commerce" and "to carry out needed safety research and
development."6 Federal motor vehicle safety standards(FMVSS) set minimum performance levels for those parts of
the vehicle that most affect safe operation (e.g., brakes,
tires, lighting) or that protect drivers and passengers from
death or serious injury in the event of a crash (e.g., air bags,
safety belts, etc.).'
Administrator is Dr. Jeffrey W. Runge, who is a nationally recognized physician
expert in motor vehicle injury care and prevention. See id.
4. See 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (1994); see also United States v. Ford Motor Co.,
574 F.2d 534, 539 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding the purpose of the Vehicle Safety Act
is to protect the public against unreasonable risks of accidents that might be
caused by defects in design, construction, or performance of motor vehicles and
against unreasonable risk of death or injury as a result of such accidents);
Chrysler Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 671 (6th Cir. 1972) (finding
"the explicit purpose of the [Vehicle Safety] Act, as amplified in [its] legislative
history, is to enable the Federal government to impel automobile manufacturers
to develop and apply new technology to the task of improving safety design of
automobiles as readily as possible"); Truck Safety Equip. Inst. v. Kane, 466 F.
Supp. 1242, 1248 (M.D. Pa. 1979) (classifying the Vehicle Safety Act as a
"detailed and pervasive regulatory scheme designed to reduce traffic accidents
and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic accidents throughout
the United States by requirement of uniform national standards").
5. See Jeff Plungis, Auto Safety Panel on Autopilot, DETROIT NEWS, May 30,
2001, at BI.
6. 49 U.S.C. § 30101. Pursuant to 49 C.F.R. § 1.50, DOT has delegated much
of its authority under the Vehicle Safety Act to NHTSA. See also supra note 3.
The original Act conferred authority to issue safety standards on the Secretary
of Commerce. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1391(10), 1392(a) (1964) (repealed 1994). By
subsequent legislation, Congress transferred all powers of the Act to the
Secretary of Transportation. The Secretary delegated these powers, with
several exceptions, to the Federal Highway Administrator until March 22, 1970,
at which time they were withdrawn and delegated to the National Highway
Safety Bureau (predecessor of NHTSA) contemporaneous with the Bureau's
separation from the Highway Administrator and elevation within the
Department to the status of an Administration. By terms of the Highway Safety
Act of 1970, the National Highway Safety Bureau became the NHTSA.
7. FMVSS 209 was the first standard to become effective on March 1, 1967
(regulating seat belt assemblies). A number of FMVSSs became effective for
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The Vehicle Safety Act also imposes upon motor vehicle
manufacturers a duty to notify both NHTSA and the
owners of their vehicles when the manufacturers learn the
vehicles possess "safety-related defects," and then to
remedy those defects without charge to the owners
(together known as the "notification and remedy duty").8
The Vehicle Safety Act also envisages a notification and
remedy duty for any motor vehicle manufacturer that
"decides in good faith that [its] vehicle or equipment does
not comply with an applicable [federal] motor vehicle safety
standard,"' whether or not the noncompliance includes a
vehicles manufactured on and after January 1, 1968. "These [initial] safety
standards governed the strength and quality of seat belts and anchorages,
safety glass, impact-absorbing steering columns and its rearward displacement
in a frontal collision, safety door latches and hinges, location of dash
instrumentation, padded dash and visors and mounting of fuel tanks and filler
spouts." RALPH NADER & CLARENCE DITLOW, THE LEMON BOOK 256 (3d ed. 1990).
Other safety standards covered performance criteria for brakes, tire tread,
lights, and windshield wipers. See id. New standards and amendments to
existing standards are published in the Federal Register.
8. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30118(c), 30120 (1994). Under 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(1), a
manufacturer of a motor vehicle or replacement equipment must notify NHTSA
if the manufacturer "learns the vehicle or equipment contains a defect and
decides in good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle safety."
Notification is also required if a manufacturer "decides in good faith that the
vehicle or equipment does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety
standard prescribed under this chapter." Id. § 30118(c)(2); see also infra note 9
and accompanying text. The manufacturer's self-start remedy provisions now
found in 49 U.S.C. § 30120 did not appear in the original 1966 Act but were
added by the Motor Vehicle and Schoolbus Safety Amendments of 1974, Pub. L.
93-492, §§ 154(a), (b)(1)-(2), (c), 156, 157, 88 Stat. 1472, 1474-75. In accordance
with 49 C.F.R. § 573.6, manufacturers are required to submit consecutive
quarterly status reports for every safety recall. Failure to submit these reports
on time can result in civil penalties pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30165, or lead to an
action for injunctive relief pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 30163.
9. 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(2). These standards are the federal motor vehicle
safety standards (FMVSSs) codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571 (2000). See supra note
7 and accompanying text. However, if a manufacturer determines that a defect
or noncompliance with a federal motor vehicle safety standard is
"inconsequential" as it relates to motor vehicle safety, then the manufacturer
may be exempted from the Act's notification and remedy requirements. See 49
U.S.C. § 30118(d) (1994); 49 C.F.R. pt. 556 (2000). For an example of NHTSA
denying an automobile manufacturer's application for a determination of
inconsequential noncompliance, see General Motors Corp., 66 Fed. Reg. 18,518
(Apr. 9, 2001) (NHTSA denying application of GM petition for inconsequential
noncompliance relating to model year 1996 through 1999 Chevrolet and GMC
vans in which the audible seat belt warning signal, when the seat belt is not
buckled, operates for less than the four to eight seconds mandated by 49 C.F.R.
§ 571.208 (2000)).
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safety-related defect. The notification and remedy duty for
a noncompliance arises whether a motor vehicle manu-
facturer actually determines, or should have determined,
that its vehicles contain a safety-related defect."
The Vehicle Safety Act defines the term "defect" rather
circularly to include "any defect in performance,
construction, a component, or material of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment."2 A defect is "safety-related" if it
presents an "unreasonable risk of accidents." 3  More
specifically, a vehicle or vehicle component contains a
"safety-related defect" if it is subject to a significant number
of failures in normal operation, including failures either
occurring during specified use or resulting from owner
abuse (including inadequate maintenance) that is
reasonably foreseeable, but excluding failures attributable
to normal deterioration of a component as a result of age
and wear." Prima facie proof of a defect in a class of
10. See United States v. Chrysler Corp., 158 F.3d 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir.
1998) (noting that "NHTSA may seek recall of a motor vehicle.., when a
vehicle 'does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard'" and
that "fain allegation of noncompliance may or may not include a charge that a
vehicle has a safety defect") (citation omitted).
11. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 F. Supp. 1555, 1559 n.5
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that a "manufacturer cannot evade its statutory
obligations: that exist when it determines that a defect is safety-related "by the
expedient of declining... to reach its own conclusion as to the relationship
between a defect in its vehicles and... safety' ") (quoting United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 574 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1983). However, under the
Vehicle Safety Act, failure to notify customers of safety-related defects does not
constitute mail and wire fraud for purposes of establishing racketeering activity
of mail and/or wire fraud. See, e.g., Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514,
521-22 (11th Cir. 2000) (finding that a motor vehicle manufacturer that fails to
disclose safety-related defects to purchasers does not commit federal mail or
wire fraud).
12. 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(2) (1994).
13. See id. § 30102(a)(8). In determining the existence of a "defect," courts
should also adopt a "commonsense" approach in ascertaining what constitutes
an unreasonable risk. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 565 F.2d 754,
757 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (carburetor defect). However, as a general proposition, any
defect that involves a loss of control presumptively presents an unreasonable
risk of accidents as a matter of law. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 561
F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (pitman arms defect).
14. See United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(wheel defect) (finding that the existence of a defect in a particular case depends
on: (1) the nature of the component involved; (2) the circumstances in which the
failures occurred; and (3) the number of failures experienced). Where a
component is designed to fimction without replacement over the lifetime of a
vehicle, the government may discharge its burden of establishing a defect by
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vehicles requires only a showing that a "significant"
number in the class have failed as a result of the defect. 5 A
"significant" number is merely a "non-de minimus [sic]"
quantity; the "significant" number need not be "a
substantial percentage of the total."" Evidence of a non-de
minimis number of defect-induced failures establishes a
rebuttable presumption of the existence of a class-wide
defect in the vehicles, and the burden of proof shifts to the
motor vehicle manufacturer to rebut the government's
prima facie showing.
Under the Vehicle Safety Act, if the Secretary of the
DOT determines that certain vehicles contain either a
safety-related defect or do not comply with any FMVSS,
then the Secretary may administratively order the
manufacturer to take remedial action. The Secretary's
order is judicially enforceable. 8 The Vehicle Safety Act
grants the DOT broad powers to conduct an investigation
necessary to the Act's enforcement. 9  Motor vehicle
manufacturers are required to maintain information, and to
produce such information upon request, in conjunction with
showing a significant number of failures without showing cause, but the
manufacturer may prove, as an affirmative defense, that the failures resulted
from unforeseeable owner abuse or unforeseeable neglect of vehicle
maintenance. Id. at 427.
15. See id. at 431, 438, 442.
16. Id. at 438 n.84. Evidence of a non-de minimis number of defect-induced
failures establishes a rebuttable presumption of the existence of a class-wide
defect in the vehicles. The manufacturer may also assert affirmative defenses,
for example, that the failures resulted from unforeseeable owner abuse or
neglect of vehicle maintenance. See id. at 438. In such cases manufacturer has
the burden of proof from the outset. See id. at 439 nn.88-89.
17. 49 U.S.C. § 30118(b)(2) (1994). But cf United States. v. Chrysler Corp.,
158 F.3d. 1350, 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (holding that due process principles and
the Vehicle Safety Act itself (49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(b)(2)(4), 30115) protect vehicle
manufacturers from being found out of compliance with an FMVSS if NHTSA
has failed to give fair notice of what is required by that FMVSS; absent such
notice, NHTSA may not order a recall based solely on noncompliance).
18. 49 U.S.C. § 30163(a). The enforcement provisions of the Vehicle Safety
Act are not the only means ofjudicial review of agency determinations. Judicial
review of agency determinations may be sought also under terms of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2000). See Gen. Motors Corp. v.
Volpe, 321 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Del. 1970).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 30166(b)(1). NHTSA's information gathering powers under
the Vehicle Safety Act includes issuing subpoenas to compel "any person.., to
provide information at an information gathering hearing." See 49 C.F.R. §
510.5(a) (2000).
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an investigation." The Secretary may ask manufacturers
for performance or technical data, and the Secretary may
require manufacturers to furnish written answers under
oath.21 If an investigation develops evidence of a violation,
the Secretary may refer the matter to the Attorney General,
who may bring an enforcement action in a U.S. district
court to recover civil penalties as well as to obtain
appropriate injunctive relief.22 Manufacturers may
challenge an enforcement action in federal court, although
the chances of winning are about 20%.23
During the thirty-three year period from the Vehicle
Safety Act's birth in 1966 through 1999, manufacturers
conducted over 7200 vehicle recalls that involved over 259
million vehicles; nearly all of these recalls were initiated
voluntarily by manufacturers.24 In the year 2000, vehicle
manufacturers sold a record 17.4 million vehicles in the
United States, but recalled 22.8 million for safety-related
defects and parts that did not meet federal safety
standards.25 Through the first half of 2001, automakers
have conducted 233 recalls involving 6,271,729 vehicles,
including a General Motors recall of 1.4 million full-size
20. Id. § 30166(e).
21. Id. § 30166(f).
22. Id. § 30163.
23. NHTSA has defended its mandatory recalls ten times (through Aug. 15,
2001). NHTSA has won eight of the ten cases. The two losses were to GM in the
famous X-Car case in the mid-1980s and to Chrysler in 1998. See generally Jeff
Plungis, Odds Are Against Firestone in Court, DETROIT NEWS, July 20, 2001, at
9.
24. See Letter from Robert S. Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle Safety
and Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, to L. Robert
Shelton, Executive Director, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 2
(Mar. 23, 2000) (on file with author). Historically, nearly 80% of recalls are
conducted without any NHTSA involvement. Id. The remaining 20%, again
conducted voluntarily, are "NHTSA-influenced." Id. Indeed, in these few cases,
legitimate engineering and interpretive questions may exist regarding the
presence or absence of a "safety-related defect." Yet even in these cases the
issues are reconciled through the NHTSA investigation. Id.
25. See Rick Popely, Return to Sender: Increased Production, New Models,
Tighter Tolerances Cited in Increase of Recalls, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 11, 2001,
Transportation, at 1. The greatest number of vehicles ever recalled in any year
was thirty million in 1981; however, this total is inflated because Ford recalled
twenty-one million cars with automatic transmissions that could be in reverse
when the gear indicated they were in park. Id. Consumers appear willing to
accept a certain number of recalls. A Polk Co. survey conducted in 2000
concluded that one or two recalls will not bother consumers, but three or more
rapidly shake consumer confidence. Id.
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trucks for brake problems, as well as thirty-two recalls
involving 7,173,692 items of motor vehicle equipment .
Vehicle manufacturers and safety officials cannot indicate a
single cause for the large number of recalls, although both
acknowledge that increasing production lines to meet
increased demand in addition to introducing a number of
new models are probable factors.27
Among the large number of recalls in 2000, one will
remain inextricably etched in history: the recall of millions
of Bridgestone/Firestone28 (Firestone) ATX, ATX II, and
26. These numbers are based on conversations with NHTSA. On April 5,
2001, General Motors also announced a recall of 6000 newly introduced midsize
sport-utility vehicles (model year 2002 Chevrolet TrailBlazers, GMC Envoys,
and Oldsmobile Bravadas), asking owners to park their trucks and wait for a
tow to dealers to fix a potentially dangerous steering problem that could lead to
loss of control. See Frank Swoboda, GM Tells 6,000 Owners to Park SUVs:
Possibly Serious Steering Problem Spurs Recall, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2001, at
El; see also Richard Truett, GM Halts Sales of 3 New Sport-Utilities,
AuTOMOTIvE NEWS, Apr. 9, 2001, at 3. GM will likely spend up to $15 million on
this one repair. See Dave Guilford & Mary Connelly, GM, Ford Dole out Perks,
AUToMoTIVE NEWS, Apr. 16, 2001, at 1. Despite delaying the sale of the all new
model year 2002 Explorers, Ford conducted a recall on April 9, 2001 of 56,652
new Explorers as well as the Mercury Mountaineers sport-utility vehicles,
because the rear liftgate glass tended to shatter or detach when closed. Id.; see
also Mark Truby, Bad Liftigate Plagues Explorer, DETROIT NEWS, April 10, 2001,
at 1. According to Ford, the problem occurred because a supplier failed to paint
properly and apply adhesive to the glass, which meant that the brackets
holding the glass had to be tightened too much causing the glass to pop out of
its frame. See Frank Swoboda, Ford Hits Rough Road: Firm Recalling 2002
Explorers, Going to Owners'Homes, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2001, at El.
27. Popely, supra note 25, at 1. Another factor could include the increased
number of cars and trucks on the nation's highways. In 1999, the number of
cars and trucks in operation reached an all-time high of 209.5 million. See Mark
Truby, Record Recalls Plague Automakers: Defects Are Raising Doubts About
Gains in Vehicle Quality, DETROIT NEWS, Sept. 29, 2000, at 1. Also, motor
vehicle manufacturers may be more committed now than in prior years in
trying to fix problems that arise. The growth of the Internet has provided
disgruntled consumers with an easy tool to file complaints and disseminate
negative experiences, possibly adding to the pressure a motor vehicle
manufacturer may feel in determining whether to conduct a recall. The trend of
increased recalls can also be seen in other major automobile markets, such as
Germany. In the year 2000, vehicle manufacturers sold approximately 3.4
million vehicles in Germany while conducting ninety-four recalls, which
represents a 10.6% increase in recalls compared with 1999. See FEDERAL MOTOR
VEHICLE OFFICE, ANNUAL PRESS REPORT 2001 (2001), available at the Office's
homepage http://www.kba.de (in German).
28. Bridgestone is the Japanese parent company of Firestone. Firestone is
Bridgestone's unit for tire manufacturing and sales in the Americas. Firestone
brand tires account for approximately 70% of Bridgestone's sales in the United
States, whereas Bridgestone brand tires account for the remaining 30%. See
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Wilderness AT tires on Ford Explorer sport-utility vehicles.
The events surrounding this recall unleashed an atmo-
sphere in Washington not seen since Ralph Nader led his
"raiders" to lobby Congress on passage of the original
Vehicle Safety Act. This atmosphere ultimately culminated
with Congress passing the TREAD Act, 9 which ushered in
the most wide-sweeping amendments ever seen to the
Vehicle Safety Act.
B. The TREAD Act of 2000
1. Background Events. The events that led Congress to
amend the Vehicle Safety Act in late fall of 2000 are well
known, well documented," and need only select elaboration
here.
In 1990, Firestone began to produce a specially-
designed fifteen-inch "ATX" tire for use as original
equipment on the Ford Explorer Sport-Utility Vehicle
(SUV), which Ford introduced in model year 1991.31 The
ATX tire was also sold directly to consumers as replacement
equipment, and was used as original equipment on several
other Ford models. 2 Firestone introduced a redesigned
James B. Treece, Firestone Tire Recall Punctures Bridgestone's Profit,
AuToMoTIvE NEWS, Aug. 13, 2001, at 8.
29. Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000).
30. Several articles provide excellent background on the Firestone tire
recalls that led to passage of the TREAD Act. See, e.g., James R. Healey, Special
Report: Firestone Leaves an Indelible Mark, USA TODAY, Dec. 26, 2000, at 1B;
Keith Naughton & Mark Hosenball, Ford vs. Firestone, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 18,
2000, at 26; Alex Taylor HI, Jac Nasser's Biggest Test, FORTUNE, Sept. 18, 2000,
at 123; Daniel Eisenberg, Anatomy of a Recall; How a Small-Town Lawsuit in
Texas Cascaded into the Biggest Consumer Panic Since the Tylenol Scare,
Plaguing Firestone and Ford with Allegations of Factory Flaws and Design
Errors, TIME, Sept. 11, 2000, at 11; John Greenwald, Firestone's Tire Crisis; The
Company Recalls 6.5 Million of Its Most Widely Used Tires. Did It Act Fast
Enough?, TIME, Aug. 21, 2000, at 64.
31. The Explorer is not only Ford's top-selling SUV in the world but also one
of Ford's most profitable vehicles; each Explorer sold represents more than
$10,000 in gross profit and $4000 in operating profit to Ford. David Kiley, After
Tireless Efforts, Ford Launches All-New Explorer 2002 Model Looks the Same,
But Automaker Says It's Not, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2001, at lB.
32. In addition to being installed on the Explorer (model years 1991-2000),
the Firestone tires were also installed on the Mercury Twin Mountaineer
(model years 1996-2000), Ford Ranger pickup truck (model years 1991-2000),
Ford F-Series Light Trucks (model years 1991-1994), Ford Bronco (model years
1991-1994), Mazda Navajo (model years 1991-1994), and Mazda B-series pickup
trucks (model years 1994-1996). NATIONAL HIGIWAY TRANSPORTATION SAFETY
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version of the tire in 1995 (under the name "ATX I") and
again in 1996 (under the name 'Wilderness AT").
Beginning in 1996, Firestone began receiving numerous
claims relating to the fifteen-inch version of the ATX, ATX
II, and Wilderness AT tires. Most of these claims alleged
that these tires suffered from tread separation. Tread
separation occurs when the tread and one steel belt
separate from the other steel belt." When the treads
separated on the tires, the Explorer often rolled over with
fatal results. Beginning in mid-1997, Ford dealers in the
Middle East began to report similar problems with the
sixteen-inch version of the ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT
tires. Ford and Firestone conducted tests shortly thereafter.
These tests ultimately led to limited recall actions in the
Middle East, Venezuela, Malaysia, and Thailand in 1999
and the spring of 2000. Neither Ford nor Firestone notified
NHTSA of any of these recall actions-nor were they
required to under law.
On February 7, 2000, a Houston television station
(KHOU) aired an exclusive report that described fatal
ADMINISTRATION, FIRESTONE TIRE REALm, at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/
hot/Firestone/Index.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2001). Ford owns a 33.4%
controlling stake in Mazda. See Todd Zaun, As the Yen Weakens, Japan's Auto
Makers Score Windfalls, WALL ST. J., Apr. 10, 2001, at A15.
33. According to a study released by Firestone on December 19, 2000, a
combination of factors, including cracks, low inflation pressure, overloaded
vehicles, and variations in tire belt adhesion characteristics, caused increased
tread separations of Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires. Firestone
Says Defects Plus Other Factors Cause Increase in Tire Tread Problems, 29
Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 17, 17 (Jan. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Firestone
Says Defects]. After examining more than 2500 recalled tires, Firestone
engineers, technical experts, and statisticians concluded: (1) low inflation
pressure found in many of the recalled tires increased the running
temperatures of tires, which would contribute to a decreased belt adhesion
level; (2) a combination of overloading the vehicle and low tire pressure led to a
"decreased margin of safety for tire performance"; and (3) ATX and Wilderness
AT fifteen-inch tires produced at the Decatur, Illinois plant exhibited lower
initial adhesion than those same tires produced at other Bridgestone/Firestone
plants. Id. According to a Ford report submitted to NHTSA, faulty tire design
and manufacturing by Firestone, as well as customers' tire care, not the design
of the Explorer, caused the accidents. See Ford Clears Explorers in Tread
Accident Blame, DETROIT NEWS & FREE PRESS, Apr. 21, 2001, at 11A. According
to Jill Batina, a spokeswoman for Bridgestone/Firestone, both companies are to
blame. See Alejandro Bodipo-Memba, Report Cites Tire Flaws: 2 Consumer
Groups' Joint Study Conflicts with Other Findings, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr.
25, 2001, at 12C.
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motor vehicle accidents allegedly as a result of tread
separation from certain Firestone tires. 4
In March 2000, based at least in part on the KHOU
report, as well as on twenty-five complaints filed with
NHTSA from 1999 through 2000, NHTSA opened an initial
inquiry into the Firestone tire matter." On May 2, 2000,
prompted by evidence linking four deaths to the Firestone
tires, NHTSA opened a formal investigation of the
Firestone ATX, ATX II, and Wilderness AT tires manu-
factured primarily for use as original equipment on Ford
Explorers.36
On August 9, 2000, after meetings with NHTSA and
Ford, Firestone announced a voluntary recall of 14.4 million
tires, which represented all ATX and ATX II fifteen-inch
tires manufactured in North America since 1991 and
Wilderness AT tires of the same size manufactured at
Firestone's Decatur, Illinois plant." "Firestone estimated
that approximately 6.5 million of the affected tires were
still in service on the date the recall was announced."38 The
recall was announced following an analysis by Ford and
Firestone that identified a "statistically significant" number
of tread separations occurring in the affected tires. 9 Most of
the affected tires were installed on the Ford Explorer."
NHTSA continued to urge Firestone to expand its
voluntary recall to include the Wilderness AT tires
produced at other plants. 1 The investigation undertaken by
NHTSA on May 2, 2000 concluded in July 2001 with
NHTSA issuing a statement that Firestone should expand
its recall to include all Wilderness AT tires.4 ' However,
Firestone refused at that time to expand its recall this wide;
34. At about this time, Firestone had already recorded 193 personal injury
claims; 2288 property damage claims; and was a defendant in 66 law suits
related to the tires covered by the investigation. Advanced Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking: Record Retention, 66 Fed. Reg. 6532, 6533 (Jan. 22, 2001).
35. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 7 (2000).
36. S. REP. No. 106-423, at 1-2 (2000). According to NHTSA, most of the
injuries and fatalities caused by Firestone tire failures occurred in warm-
weather climates, such as Texas, Arizona, Louisiana, Nevada, Georgia, and
Tennessee. Id. at 2.
37. See S. REP. No. 106-423, at 2.
38. See id.; FORD MOTOR Co., 2000 ANNuAL REPORT 22 (2001).
39. See FORD MOTOR CO., supra note 38, at 22.
40. Id.; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 7 (2000).
42. See Statement from the U.S. Dep't of Transp. Concerning the Firestone
Tire Investigation (July 19, 2001), at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot07301.htm.
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rather, Firestone agreed to examine and replace those tires
on a case-by-case basis."
Upset because Firestone did not expand the recall, ex-
Ford CEO Jacques Nasser announced on May 22, 2001 that
Ford would spend as much as $3 billion to undertake the
largest product recall in automotive history,' namely, the
replacement of ten million to thirteen million of the
Firestone Wilderness AT tires that were not subject to the
initial recall, including 1.5 million tires that were mounted
on the vehicles as replacements.4" This announcement
followed Firestone's action to sever a ninety-five year-old
supplier relationship with Ford.46
Through October 4, 2001, NHTSA said that 271 people
died and over 700 people suffered injuries in accidents
involving Firestone Wilderness AT and ATX tires (mostly
involving Explorer rollovers); ten of these deaths are linked
to tires that are among the ten to thirteen million tires Ford
began to replace in the May 2001 round of recalls.47
Bridgestone/Firestone announced on June 27, 2001 that it
intends to close the Decatur, Illinois tire plant, which was
linked to numerous quality problems.48 Firestone expects to
lose approximately $210 million for costs tied to closing the
43. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 7 (2000).
44. See Joann Muller et al., Ford: Why It's Worse Than You Think, Bus.
WK., June 25, 2001, at 80.
45. See Keith Bradsher, Ford Begins a Recall of 13 Million Tires, N.Y.
TIMEs, May 23, 2001, at C1. Ford will replace all Firestone Wilderness AT tires,
in fifteen-, sixteen-, and seventeen-inch sizes, on all Ford products, as well as
all Wilderness tires purchased as replacement tires. Id.
46. See Joseph B. White et al., Ford Intends to Replace Millions of Tires,
WALL. ST. J., May 23, 2001, at A3.
47. See Timothy Aeppel et al., Firestone Broadens Recall of Defective Tires,
WALL ST. J, Oct. 5, 2001, at A3; Jeff Plungis & Mark Truby, Feds Launch
Explorer Inquiry, DETROIT NEWS, June 20, 2001, at 1; Joseph B. White et al.,
Agency to Comment on Ford Tire Safety, While Inquiry into Explorer Is
Considered, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2001, at A8. As of February 6, 2001, NHTSA
had received over 6000 complaints relating to Firestone tires. See Firestone
Recall Complaints Listing, at http://www.nhtsa.gov/hot/firestone/update.html
(last modified June 28, 2001). Many of these complaints involve tire tread
separation or blowout that led to a vehicle rollover. See id.
48. See Firestone Says Defects, supra note 33. Decatur is one of six
Bridgestone/Firestone plants in North America that make passenger and light
truck tires. The Decatur plant makes several lines of tires, many for light
trucks, specifically Ford's Explorer. See Jennifer Dixon, Troubled Tire Plant to
Be Closed, DETROIT FREE PRESs, June 28, 2001, at 12A.
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plant. 9 For the year 2001, Firestone expects to report a loss
of $530 million after taxes."0 Bridgestone already has set
aside $800 million to pay for the recall and the expected
cost of settling lawsuits involving the recalled tires.5'
Ongoing costs to fund the recall of Firestone tires caused
Bridgestone to lose $251.1 million in the first half of 2001.52
For all of 2001, Bridgestone estimates that net profit will
drop 44% compared with 2000."' On the other side, in
addition to finding the $3 billion follow-up recall, Ford
continues to defend numerous personal injury and class
action lawsuits totaling over $590 million, not including
potential punitive damages awards, relating to rollovers of
Explorers equipped with Firestone tires.54 In total, at least
280 personal injury lawsuits involving Firestone tire
failures have been filed in the United States alone; as of
July 23, 2001, Firestone had already settled 200, or 40% of
the total outstanding, of the claims and lawsuits filed
against it."
The events surrounding the recall of Firestone tires
prompted Congress to accuse NHTSA of not "adequately
detect[ing] and investigat[ing] safety-related defects in
motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment."56 Accordingly,
"in response to the deficiencies highlighted by [the
Firestone] incident," Congress, after holding intensive
49. See David Barboza, Bridgestone/Firestone to Close Tire Plant at Center
of Huge Recall, N.Y. TIMiES, June 28, 2001, at CL. "About 1,500 employees,
mostly union workers and many with more than 20 years of experience, will
probably lose their jobs." Id. Firestone insists the decision to close the factory
was based solely on economic concerns and did not reflect the performance of
workers and the Decatur plant. Id.
50. See Dixon, supra note 48.
51. See Peter Landers & Todd Zaun, Bridgestone Takes Gamble in Ford
Case-In Cutting Off Client, Tire Maker Obtains Room to Defend Itself, WALL
ST. J., May 23, 2001, at A21.
52. See Bridgestone Posts First-Half Loss on Massive U.S. Tire Recalls,
DETROIT NEWS, Aug. 10, 2001. In sharp contrast to a year ago, through the first
six months of 2000, Bridgestone earned a profit of $155.2 million. Id.
53. Treece, supra note 28.
54. See FORD MOTOR CO., supra note 38, at 22; Muller et al., supra note 44,
at 80.
55. NHTSA Updates Database to 174 Deaths: 6,000 Complaints Linked to
Firestone Tires, 29 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 174, 174 (Feb. 12, 2001).
Personal injury lawyer Tab Turner from Little Rock, Arkansas, has filed 174
suits against Ford and Firestone in state courts nationwide. White et al., supra
note 46, at A3. Stephen Power & Clare Ansberry, Firestone Girds for Battle
Against Bigger Recall, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2001, at A3.
56. S. REP. No. 106-423, at 1 (2000).
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hearings, amended the Vehicle Safety Act "to improve and
strengthen the Secretary's [i.e., NHTSA's] ability to detect
and investigate defects."
2. Congressional Action. Concerned about how Ford,
Firestone, and NHSTA were handling the overseas tire
recalls, Congress held hearings in September 2000 to assess
the situation. In particular, Congress felt a need to
strengthen NHTSA's ability to identify defects, even though
State Farm insurance officials confirmed that the company
warned NHTSA via e-mail as early as 1998 that State Farm
saw twenty-one potential failures of Firestone ATX tires
(fourteen involving Explorers) in claims over six and a half
years." That e-mail was followed a year later by a telephone
call from State Farm to NHTSA warning of a growing
number of Firestone failures." Yet NHTSA failed to act.
Congressional hearings that followed in the wake of the
Firestone recall focused, however, not on this NHTSA
failure to act, but rather chiefly on Ford and Firestone's
behavior.
On September 6 and again on September 21, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection held a joint hearing with the House
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations into the
Firestone recall actions. Speaking for the House Commerce
Committee in justifying the congressional hearings,
Congressman John D. Dingell (D-Mich. and ranking
Democratic member of the House Commerce Committee)
argued: "'There have been a significant number of tire
failures which have caused accidents, in which people were
injured or killed' .... 'That constitutes a real threat to the
public safety and is something into which Congress should
look."'
Not to be outdone, the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation held its own hearings on
September 12, 2000.
57. Id.
58. See Jennifer Dixon, Insurance Firms Going After Ford, Firestone,
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 2001, at 1; see also Mark Skertic, Tire Firm Faces
House Probe: Panel to Ask Why Problems Went Unchecked, CHI. SuN-TIMEs,
Aug. 17, 2000, at 8.
59. Skertic, supra note 58, at 8.
60. Richard A. Ryan & Mark Truby, Ford: Firestone Dragged Feet, DETROIT
NEWS, Sept. 6, 2000, at 1.
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When finally completed, Congress had heard testimony
from Jacques Nasser, (then) President and CEO of Ford
Motor Company;6 Masatoshi Ono, (then) Chief Executive
Officer, Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc.;6  Rodney T. Slater,
(then) Secretary of Transportation; Dr. Sue Bailey, (then)
Administrator of NHTSA; Joan Claybrook, former NHTSA
Administrator under President Carter and current
President of Public Citizen (a self-proclaimed consumer
advocacy group with close ties to personal injury and lemon
law attorneys); and Clarence Ditlow, Executive Director of
the Center for Auto Safety (officially a non-profit
organization founded by Consumers Union and Ralph
Nader in 1970, but now independent of both; nevertheless,
this self-proclaimed consumer advocacy group retains close
financial ties to personal injury and lemon law attorneys)."
The testimony revealed five overarching concerns that
Congress ultimately sought to remedy: (1) a (perceived)
ineffectiveness and inefficiency of NHTSA's process of
gathering and analyzing data pertaining to vehicle defects,
initiating investigations, and issuing recalls; (2) NHTSA's
failure to update the Federal motor vehicle safety
standards, in particular the standards for tires; (3) the
61. Because of (or despite) his handling of the Ford-Firestone tire recall,
Ford paid Nasser $12.1 million for his services in 2000, which represented a
19% increase over his 1999 salary. See Norihiko Shirouzu, Ford Paid Its CEO
Nasser $12.1 Million in 2000, Up 19%, Despite Tire Problem, WALL ST. J., Apr.
11, 2001, at A8. Perhaps Ford credits Nasser, through his direct television
campaign in the recall's wake, with having effectively pinned the blame of
Explorer rollovers on Firestone tires, not Ford or the Explorer. Jamie Butters,
Ford Raises Nasser's Salary, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Apr. 11, 2001, at 7A. On
October 30, 2001, Ford forced the resignation of Jacques Nasser as Ford's
President and CEO, replacing him with William Clay Ford, Jr., the great-
grandson of Henry Ford. See Danny Hakim, Effort to Overcome Rift at Troubled
Company, N.Y. TiNEES, Oct. 31, 2001, at C1. Mr. Ford said that Nasser's
handling of the Firestone recall played no role in the forced resignation. Id. This
author highly doubts Mr. Ford's assertion; however, based on the bonus paid to
Nasser during the year of the recall (see above), perhaps Mr. Ford is indeed
telling the truth.
62. Mr. Ono was asked to resign by Bridgestone President Yoichiro Kaizaki.
Ono returned to the Bridgestone parent company, where he eventually resigned
on January 31, 2001. See Bridgestone President to Quit in March; Tire Recall
Marred Kaizaki's Tenure, WASH. POST, Jan. 12, 2001, at E3. Ono was replaced
by John T. Lampe. For background on Mr. Lampe, see David Welch, Meet the
New Face of Firestone, BUS. WE., Apr. 30, 2001, at 64.
63. For an excellent discussion of how personal injury and class action
attorneys worked (and continue to work) together in suing Firestone, see Mike
France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 115-20.
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absence of a federal law requiring manufacturers to notify
NHTSA of recalls or safety-related actions taken in foreign
countries that involve products sold in the United States;"
(4) the absence of a routine "early warning" reporting
system, (i.e., the fact that NHTSA did not require
manufacturers to report information relevant to defects
that may indicate a safety problem with vehicles);" and (5)
the need to increase civil penalties and belief "that criminal
penalties should be imposed in cases of particularly
egregious acts."
66
64. Ford replaced Firestone tires in sixteen foreign countries beginning in
August 1999, but Ford did not notify-nor was Ford required to notify-NHTSA.
If Ford had replaced the Firestone tires on its vehicles sold in the United
States, 49 U.S.C. § 30166(f) would have required both companies to report their
actions to N-TSA. See S. REP. No. 106-423, at 2 (2000).
65. For example, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation noted that "NHTSA does not collect claims data that may serve
as an early indicator of a problem." See S. REP. No. 106-423, at 2. Personal
injury and property claims and lawsuits involving the Firestone recalled tires
began to increase as early as 1996, yet neither Ford nor Firestone were
obligated to inform NHTSA. See id. Ms. Claybrook testified that NHTSA should
force vehicle manufacturers to notify NHTSA whenever customers filed three or
more lawsuits dealing with the same vehicle problem. See Firestone Tire Recall:
Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 106th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2000) (statement of Joan Claybrook),
available at http://www.senate.gov/-commerce/hearings/hearings.htm (last
visited Nov. 10, 2001). Ms. Claybrook did not discuss the cost to the
manufacturer, and ultimately the customer, nor the intrusion into business
caused by this recommendation. See id. Nor did she discuss how three
complaints could possibly indicate any safety-related defect, especially
considering her call for reporting for any reason. See id. In other words, her
recommendation would seem to imply that three customer complaints-and
nothing more-justify a notification requirement to the federal government. Yet
three customer complaints could be merely subjective dissatisfaction reports
with the vehicle and not objective failures indicating the existence of a safety-
related defect. Ms. Claybrook's suggestion, however, does not distinguish
between these situations.
66. See S. REP. No. 106-423, at 3. Ms. Claybrook and Mr. Ditlow called on
Congress to amend the Vehicle Safety Act so that executives of automobile
companies would face criminal penalties for manslaughter and even murder for
knowing and willful violations of Federal motor vehicle safety standards. See
Firestone Tire Recall: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 106th Cong. (Sept. 12, 2000) (statements of Joan
Claybrook & Clarence Ditlow), available at http:/www.senate.gov/-commerce/
hearings/hearings.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2001). Specifically, Mr. Ditlow
recommended removing the civil liability ceiling of $925,000 "to be in line with
the Clean Air Act which has no ceiling for violation of vehicle emission
standards." Id. (statement of Clarence Ditlow). Ms. Claybrook urged Congress
to ban all gag orders issued as part of settlement arrangements or decrees
whenever the underlying matter concerns "vehicle safety." See id. (statement of
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At the Senate hearing on September 12, 2000, Jacques
Nasser agreed to several major reforms that Congress
would later write into the TREAD Act, thereby applying not
only to Ford but also to the entire automobile industry.
Nasser, de facto representative of the entire automobile
industry, accepted Congress's proposals to: (1) require
companies to notify NHTSA of recalls in foreign countries
involving motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment sold
and used in the United States; (2) extend the five year
record retention period; (3) lengthen the statute of
limitations period on reporting defects and recalls; (4)
require manufacturers to report lawsuits in which they are
named as a defendant; and (5) increase the criminal
penalties to be imposed in cases of particularly egregious
acts. 7
Congressman Fred Upton (R-Mich.) introduced H.R.
5164 on September 13, 2000." The bill was referred to the
House Committee on Commerce, which then referred the
bill on September 14, 2000 to the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection.
Briefly, as introduced in the Senate this bill: (1) requires
manufacturers to report to DOT (i.e., NHTSA) information
about foreign recalls; (2) increases civil penalties for
manufacturers that fail to comply with the Vehicle Safety
Act (e.g., civil penalty increased from $980,000 to $15
million and imposition of a criminal penalty for falsifying or
withholding information); (3) directs DOT (i.e., NHTSA) to
conduct dynamic rollover tests of vehicles and make the
results available to the public; (4) directs NHTSA to
upgrade the current tire standard; and (5) adopts measures
designed to improve the design of child safety seats.69
Joan Claybrook). Considering that nearly every settlement in the automobile
sector could be construed to concern "vehicle safety," her suggestion, if
implemented, would effectively end the practice of issuing gag orders in the
automobile industry. Whether such a rule would pass constitutional muster
(i.e., not violate due process protections) was also not discussed or considered at
the congressional hearings.
67. See S. REP. No. 106-423, at 2-3.
68. H.R. 5164, 106th Cong. (2000). The official title as introduced read: "To
amend title 49, United States Code, to require reports concerning defects in
motor vehicles or tires or other motor vehicle equipment in foreign countries,
and for other purposes." Id. The short title as introduced read: "Transportation
Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation Act." Id.
69. Details of the bill are discussed infra Part H-.
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In the Senate, John McCain (R-Ariz.) introduced a bill
the next day (September 15, 2000) that contained, inter
alia, stronger criminal provisions than the House version."
The Senate bill would have required manufacturers to
inform the federal government about dangerous defects or
else face criminal penalties, including imprisonment up to
five years, for deliberately failing to report defects or issue a
recall where the defect caused "grievous bodily injury" (in
cases where the defect caused death, the bill envisaged
imprisonment up to fifteen years). 1 In addition, the Senate
bill differed from the House bill in that the Senate bill
authorized the President to negotiate for an international
agreement governing the dissemination of information
about the recall by manufacturers of motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment with safety-related defects. '2 The
bill was unanimously reported by the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation." However,
because of "holds" by anonymous senators, McCain could
not bring the bill to the Senate floor for a full vote.74
70. See Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Equipment Defect Notification
Improvement Act, S. 3059, 106th Cong. § 10 (2000). The short title as
introduced read: "Motor Vehicle and Motor Vehicle Equipment Defect
Notification Improvement Act." Id. § 1. The official title as introduced read: A
bill "[to amend title 49, United States Code, to require motor vehicle
manufacturers and motor vehicle equipment to obtain information and
maintain records about potential safety defects in their foreign products that
may affect the safety of vehicles and equipment in the United States, and for
other purposes." Id.
71. Id. § 10 (knowingly selling a defective vehicle or vehicle equipment that
causes grievous bodily harm is punishable by fine of not more than $10,000,
imprisonment for not more than five years, or both; knowingly selling a
defective vehicle or vehicle equipment that causes death is punishable by fine of
not more than $50,000, imprisonment for not more than fifteen years, or both).
72. See id. § 3.
73. On September 27, 2000, the Senate bill was placed on the Senate
legislative calendar under general orders, where it remained.
74. A "hold" is used in the Senate and refers to a private objection that one
or more senators may have to scheduling a matter for debate. During a "rolling
hold," one senator anonymously blocks the bill, and before the "holder" can be
"unmasked" by the bill's supporters, he or she passes off the hold to another
senator, who in turn continues the block. CBS News Correspondent Sharyl
Attkisson identified Senators Orrin Hatch (R-Utah), Jim Bunning (R-Ky.), and
Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) as three of the dozen "holders." 'The Fix Is in' On Auto
Safety Bill, CBS.com, Apr. 11, 2001, at http:/tjeo.cbsnow.comlstory/
0,1597,232610-371,00.shtml (on file with the author). Senator George Voinovich
(R-Ohio) later revealed himself as a "holder," see Stephen Power, In Response to
Firestone Recall, Senate Approves Bill to Overhaul the Nation's Auto-Safety
Laws, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2000, at A16, as did Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Ala.),
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Recognizing not only the mounting pressure on
Congress to amend the Vehicle Safety Act in such a fashion
to include a global reporting element so as to prevent
another Ford-Firestone situation but also Nasser's
announced commitment to the Senate Commerce
Committee, on September 15, 2000, the Alliance of
Automobile Manufacturers sent a letter to Dr. Sue Bailey
(Administrator of NHTSA) announcing a voluntary
commitment on behalf of its members 5 to report to NHTSA
"safety recalls and other safety campaigns that are
conducted in a foreign country on a vehicle or component
part that is also offered for sale in the United States." 6
On September 21 and 26, 2000, the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection met in open markup session" and
approved H.R. 5164 for full committee consideration.7" On
October 5, 2000, the full House Committee on Commerce
met and, after a five-hour markup session, ordered H.R.
5164 favorably reported to the House, with an amendment,
by a record vote of forty-two yeas and no nays."
see CONG. REC. S10061, daily ed. Oct. 6, 2000 (statement of Sen. Sessions).
Ultimately, the Senate approved the House bill (H.R. 5164). See infra text
accompanying notes 87-91.
75. The Alliance's members are: BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Ford,
General Motors, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Porsche, Toyota,
Volkswagen, and Volvo.
76. Letter from Robert S. Strassburger, Vice President, Vehicle Safety and
Harmonization, Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, to L. Robert Shelton,
(then) Executive Director, National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 3
(Mar. 23, 2000) (on file with author).
77. A markup session refers to the meeting a committee holds to review the
text of a bill before reporting it out. Committee members offer and vote on
proposed changes to the bill's language, known as amendments. Most markups
end with a vote to send the new version of the bill to the floor for final approval.
78. The record vote was twenty-three yeas and no nays. See H.R. REP. No.
106-954, at 8 (2000). Representative James Rogan (R-Cal.) did not vote on the
bill because he also sits on the House Judiciary Committee, which reviewed the
bill before it was sent to the House floor. See Michael Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to
TREAD Safety Bill, NAT'L J. NEws SERV., Sept. 27, 2000, available at LEXIS,
106 Markup H.R. 5164 [hereinafter Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD].
79. See Michael Steel, Commerce Committee Approves TREAD Recall Bill,
NAT'L J. NEWS SERV., Oct. 5, 2000, available at LEXIS, 106 Markup H.R. 5164
[hereinafter Steel, Commerce Committee Approves TREAD Recall Bill]; see also
H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 8 (2000). An amendment introduced by Congressman
Pallone (D-N.J.) addressing the disposal of replacement tires was withdrawn.
H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 9. Also, an amendment in the nature of a substitute
by Congressman Waxman that would have provided the Secretary of
Transportation with administrative penalty authority was voted down by the
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At 12:24 a.m. on October 11, 2000, the House passed
H.R. 5164 by voice vote.8" Later that same day, the bill was
received in the Senate. Even though Senator McCain
favored the Senate version (S. 3059), he knew that the
holds used by other Senators would continue to prevent the
Senate from voting on the bill.81 Also recognizing that
Congress was in its final days before adjournment and
perhaps wanting to pass something that could be marketed
as "consumer-friendly" before election day, which was less
than a month away, McCain urged the Senate to pass the
House version. 2 Accordingly, the Senate read the House bill
twice, considered, read the third time,83 and passed it
Committee by a record vote of fourteen yeas and thirty nays. Id. at 9-10.
Congressman Waxman's amendment would have authorized NHTSA to collect
civil penalties for violations of the law through an administrative law judge. See
Steel, Commerce Committee Approves TREAD Recall Bill, supra. Congressman
Waxman told the Committee that, under the current system, the DOT must go
to a federal district court for a full trial before levying and collecting fines if the
violator turns down DOT's or NHTSA's proposed compromise. Thus, according
to Waxman, the collection of smaller fines becomes too expensive to be
worthwhile and eliminates any deterrent effect of the fines. Waxman said his
amendment would give NHTSA a tool that other agencies, such as the FAA and
EPA already have. Accordingly, Waxman said he took his amendment language
almost directly from the Clean Air Act passed by the Commerce Committee in
1990. The full Committee was unimpressed with this argument and ultimately
voted the proposal down by a margin exceeding two to one. Id.
80. During a voice vote, members of Congress shout "aye" as a group,
followed by members who shout "no" as a group. The presiding officer then
decides which group as a whole had more shouts before announcing a final
result. No names are recorded. As passed by the House, the short title of H.R.
5164 remained the same as introduced, with the addition of the acronym
"TREAD": "Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and
Documentation (TREAD) Act." Cf. supra note 68.
81. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
82. See CONG. REC. S10,273 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
Nevertheless, let me be clear, I would prefer to have the Senate
complete action on the bill reported by the Senate Commerce
Committee with unanimous support. But holds and stalling tactics
used by some members of [the Senate] will prevent us from even
considering the Senate measure. The reality we face in the remaining
days of Congress because of these tactics is that we pass the House bill
or we pass nothing. Left with that decision, I would prefer we moved
forward with the House bill.
Id.
83. The third reading in the Senate is the last required reading just prior to
the vote on final passage. The first reading occurs when the bill is first
introduced; the second reading occurs when the bill is referred to a committee.
Bills are rarely read in full, unless a senator so demands.
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without amendment by unanimous consent.' Thus, the
House bill made it through both houses of Congress in
lightning speed of less than eighteen hours.
The bill was then presented on October 20, 2000 to
President Clinton, who signed it into law on November 1,
2000.85
3. Post-TREAD Events. Passage of the TREAD Act
hardly ended intense scrutiny of the Ford-Firestone tire
recall. Indeed, events occurring even after the Ford-
Firestone tire recall continue to generate intense media
coverage. Perhaps the most significant event surrounding
the recall since passage of the TREAD Act was Firestone's
announcement on May 21, 2001 that it would stop selling
tires to Ford. 6 As dramatic as the announcement may
seem, Ford and Firestone had not worked well together
since the recall was announced on August 9, 2000. Ford
accused Firestone of ignoring data that indicated higher
than usual failure rates for the unrecalled Wilderness AT
tires. Firestone accused Ford of questioning the safety of
Firestone tires to divert attention from steering problems
with the Explorer. John T. Lampe, Firestone's CEO, told
the New York Times that he halted Firestone's business
with Ford during a meeting on May 21, 2001 at Firestone's
headquarters in Nashville with Carlos Mazzorin, Ford's
group vice president for purchasing." When Mr. Mazzorin
said Ford would not share safety data on the Explorer, Mr.
Lampe said that he handed Mazzorin a letter terminating
the companies' relationship.88 "The rupture end[ed] a close
84. Unanimous consent means that all members on the floor agree, or
consent, to a pending request. Unanimous consent is used in both the House
and Senate and is needed when a member wishes to act contrary to or outside
regular procedures. As finally enacted, the short title read the same as passed.
Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000); see also supra note 80. The official
title remained the same as introduced in the House. Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114
Stat. 1800; see also supra note 68.
85. Pub. L. No. 106-414, 114 Stat. 1800.
86. "The cutoff with Ford applies only to Firestone tires sold for use on new
vehicles in North America, Central America, and South America. Firestone will
continue to provide tires to Ford in Europe and Asia." Landers & Zaun, supra
note 51. Firestone estimates that losing Ford as a customer will cost less than
5% of Firestone revenue, which totals about $7.5 billion. See Timothy Aeppel et
al., Firestone Quits As Tire Supplier to Ford, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2001, at A3.
87. Keith Bradsher, Firestone to Stop Sales to Ford, Saying It Was Used As




business relationship that began in the early 1900s, when
Henry Ford first tapped Harvey Firestone's company to
make tires for Ford cars."8 9 Citing a study undertaken by
Ohio State University professor Dennis Guenther,
Firestone maintains that oversteering problems in the
Explorer steering system make the vehicle difficult to
control during a tire failure."
Ford continues to reject Firestone's accusations and
maintains the problem is solely a tire problem. As
mentioned above,9' on May 22, 2001, Ford announced it
would pay up to $3 billion to replace thirteen million
Firestone Wilderness AT tires installed mainly on Ford
Explorers, including 1.5 million Wilderness AT tires that
were mounted on the vehicles as replacements during the
Firestone tire recall from August 2000.92 Ford will
undoubtedly try to persuade NHTSA that the May 2001
recall was mandatory under the Vehicle Safety Act. By so
doing, Firestone, not Ford, would be forced to pay for the
recall. Until such time, Ford and Firestone will continue to
sling mud in the public relations forum, which ultimately
undermines both companies' credibility before a jury and
serves as fodder for aggressive personal injury lawyers."
At further congressional hearings held on June 19,
2001, Michael P. Jackson, Deputy Secretary of
Transportation, said that NHTSA would evaluate
Firestone's claims of Explorer steering defects through a
preliminary investigation with results by the end of July
2001."4 Only if the preliminary investigation yielded
89. Aeppel et al., supra note 86, at A12. Ford was Firestone's largest single
customer, representing 5% of Firestone's revenues. See Dixon, supra note 48, at
B1.
90. See Plungis & Truby, supra note 47. Firestone also claims that Florida
accident data suggests that the Explorer rolled over four times as often as
comparable SUVs. Id.
91. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
92. See also Keith Bradsher, Ford Intends to Replace 13 Million Firestone
Wilderness Tires, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2001, at C1. "Ford will pay up to $110
per fifteen- and sixteen-inch tire and $130 per seventeen-inch tire. The
company said it would take an aftertax write-off against earnings of $2.1
billion... to cover the expense of the recall." Id. at C4.
93. See Aeppel et al., supra note 86, at A3 (quoting personal injury lawyer
Mike Edison, co-lead plaintiffs counsel for more than 200 individual death and
injury cases filed in federal courts nationwide against Ford and Firestone as
saying, "We couldn't be in a better situation in any case than to have two
defendants fighting each other.").
94. Plungis & Truby, supra note 47.
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substantial evidence of a safety-related defect would
NHTSA proceed to the second phase of the defect
investigation, i.e., the engineering analysis.95 Indeed, on
July 19, 2001, the DOT issued a press statement indicating
that the results of its preliminary investigation show that
Firestone will need to expand its recall of August 9, 2000.96
Indeed, on October 4, 2001, Bridgestone/Firestone reversed
course and agreed to replace nearly 800,000 Firestone
Wilderness AT tires, which are the fifteen- and sixteen-inch
tires manufactured in Firestone's Wilson, N.C., Joliette,
Quebec and Oklahoma City factories before May 1998 that
were mounted on Ford Explorers, Ford Ranger Pickups,
and Mercury Mountaineers. Although the number of tires
affected was 3.5 million, because of Ford's voluntary
replacement program began in May 2001, the open number
of tires affected is now about 768,000.9 This thirty million
dollar recall closes NHTSA's high-profile investigation,
originally begun in early 2000.9'
Lastly, on October 30, 2001, Ford fired Jacques Nasser
as President and CEO, though it denied that the firing had
anything to do with the Firestone recall.' 0
II. ANALYSIS
A. Purpose of the TREAD Act
Troubled not only by a perceived malfeasance by top
management at both Ford and Firestone-in particular by
top management's decision not to report the overseas safety
campaigns involving the affected tires, but also (though to a
lesser extent) by how NHTSA failed to act on customer
complaints and information provided by State Farm-
Congress felt compelled to "act," i.e., pass additional
legislation that would be designed to prevent another Ford-
Firestone situation. In the words of the House Committee
on Commerce, which authored the TREAD Act and
95. Id.
96. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp., Concerning the Firestone Tire
Investigation (July 19, 2001), http://www.dot.gov/affairs/dot07301.htm.
97. See Harry Stoffer, Firestone Surrenders As Hard-Line Strategy Fails,
AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 8, 2001, at 1, 8; see also Jeff Plungis & Mark Truby,
Feds Side with Ford, DETROr NEWS, Oct. 5, 2001, at 1.
98. See Stoffer, supra note 97, at 8.
99. See Aeppel et al., supra note 47, at A3; Stoffer, supra note 97, at 8.
100. See Hakim, supra note 61.
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Commerce, which authored the TREAD Act and
unanimously recommended passage to the full House, the
events surrounding the Ford-Firestone situation made clear
that: (1) "the data available to NHTSA regarding the
problems with Firestone tires was insufficient"'' and (2)
"NHTSA did not effectively use the data it did have in its
possession to spot the trends related to the failure of th[oseltires. - °
Accordingly, relying on constitutional authority vested
in the Commerce Clause, which grants Congress the power
to "regulate commerce . . . among the several States," 3
Congress amended the Vehicle Safety Act to require
manufacturers to provide NHTSA with "appropriate data in
a timely fashion, including [data] related to foreign recall
actions and internal company data on claims and lawsuits
related to defects."04
In signing H.R. 5164 into law on November 1, 2000,
President Clinton noted that the TREAD Act's purpose is
"[to respond] directly to some of the key shortcomings in
identifying the recent Firestone tire problem."0 5
B. Section-By-Section Analysis
The means used by Congress to effectuate the
enunciated ends include mandating new in-vehicle tire
pressure warning devices and increased reporting
obligations on manufacturers, in particular, for overseas
recalls and overseas "safety campaigns." Congress
strengthened both the civil and criminal penalties of the
101. H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 7 (2000).
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 12.
104. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Record Retention, 66
Fed. Reg. 6532 (Jan. 22, 2001); cf. S. 3059, 106th Cong. (2000) ("to require motor
vehicle manufacturers and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers to obtain
information and maintain records about potential safety defects in their foreign
products that may affect the safety of vehicles and equipment in the United
States, and for other purposes").
105. Clinton Signs Tire-Safety Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at E2; see also
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 2, 2000, at E2. According to White House spokesman Jason
Schechter, 'President Clinton strongly [supported] this legislation because he
believes it strengthens the government's ability to investigate vehicle safety
defects and incorporates many of the changes the administration sought."
Janet L. Fix, Groups Deride Auto Safety Bill, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 24,
2000, at B1. However, President Clinton did not comment on NHTSA's failure
to respond to State Farm's information. See id.
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Vehicle Safety Act to underscore the seriousness of failing
to report overseas actions. This part of the article analyzes
the TREAD Act section-by-section, focusing on the key
changes to the Vehicle Safety Act, particularly as they
relate to the automotive industry.
1. Short Title. Section 1 provides the short title of the
bill, namely, the "Transportation Recall Enhancement,
Accountability, and Documentation (TREAD) Act."' The
short title of the Senate bill was the "Motor Vehicle and
Motor Vehicle Equipment Defect Notification Improvement
Act.' ' 10 7 Clearly, the House version wins the day for catchier
acronym.
2. Reporting Requirements. In addition to the increased
penalties,0 8 the most controversial aspects of the TREAD
Act are the new reporting requirements. The new reporting
requirements include not only a new international
component, but also mandate regular reporting of "early
warning" information streams, including information that
could be considered highly sensitive to vehicle
manufacturers, such as field reports and claims data. The
impact of these amendments will depend on the specifics of
NHTSA's rulemaking over the coming months.
As noted above, under the Vehicle Safety Act (pre-
TREAD), a manufacturer of a motor vehicle or replacement
equipment must notify NHTSA if the manufacturer "learns
the vehicle or equipment contains a defect and decides in
good faith that the defect is related to motor vehicle
safety."0 9  Prior to passage of the TREAD Act, a
manufacturer's automatic (i.e., not in response to NHTSA's
information requests under which information is required
as part of an investigation) reporting obligations were to
provide copies of communications about defects and
106. Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 1, 114 Stat. 1800 (2000); see also supra notes 68,
80, 84 and accompanying text.
107. See S. 3059, 106th Cong. § 1; see also supra note 70 and accompanying
text.
108. See infra notes 158-83 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 8. Notification is also required if a manufacturer
"decides in good faith that the vehicle or equipment does not comply with an
applicable motor vehicle safety standard." 49 U.S.C. § 30118(c)(2) (1994); see
supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance(s).110  Specifically, a manufacturer must
provide to NHTSA a copy of all "notices, bulletins, and
other communications," including warranty and policy
extension communications, "regarding any defect in its
vehicles or items of equipment (including any failure or
malfunction beyond normal deterioration in use, or any
failure of performance, or flaw or unintended deviation from
design specifications), whether or not such defect is safety
related."
In the House Committee Report accompanying the
TREAD Act, Congress noted that NHTSA did not have
adequate, timely data about Firestone ATX and Wilderness
AT tires."2 Accordingly, the TREAD Act seeks to ensure
that NHTSA receives data in a timely fashion, including
data related to foreign recall actions and internal company
data on claims and lawsuits related to defects."1
a. Foreign Recalls and Safety Campaigns. The TREAD
Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to require a vehicle
manufacturer, not later than five days after determining (or
after receiving notification that the government of a foreign
country has determined) to conduct a safety recall or other
safety campaign in a foreign country on a motor vehicle,
tire, or motor vehicle equipment that is also offered for sale
in the United States, to report such determination to the
NHTSA."4  The TREAD Act also sets forth similar
requirements for reporting possible defects (in a vehicle or
equipment) that have resulted in a significant number of
serious injuries or fatalities in a foreign country.' These
amendments to the Vehicle Safety Act arose because of
criticism leveled against Ford for replacing tires on
Explorers in Saudi Arabia and Venezuela without
informing NHTSA or Explorer owners in the United
States. 6
110. See 49 U.S.C. § 30166(f) (1994); 49 C.F.R. § 573.8 (2000).
111. See 49 C.F.R. § 573.8 (2000). These reports are submitted on a monthly
basis. Id.
112. See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 7 (2000); see also supra notes 60-66 and
accompanying text.
113. Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Record Retention, 66 Fed.
Reg. 6532, 6534 (Jan. 22, 2001).
114. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 3(a), 114 Stat. 1800 (2000) (to be codifed at
49 U.S.C. § 30166).
115. Id.
116. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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Some of the impact on the automotive industry as a
result of these new reporting requirements was taken away
weeks before passage because of the commitment assumed
by vehicle manufacturers to "voluntarily report to [NHTSA]
safety recalls and other safety campaigns that are
conducted in a foreign country on a vehicle or component
part that is also offered for sale in the United States." 7
Although not legally binding on the automotive industry,
the automobile manufacturers view the letter as binding
and market forces would have assured compliance with the
terms of the letter without congressional intervention or the
need for additional legislation.
Remaining disturbingly vague and ambiguous are key
provisions regarding the scope of the new reporting
requirements. Specifically, the TREAD Act calls for
reporting of a safety recall or other safety campaign in a
foreign country "on a motor vehicle or motor vehicle
equipment that is identical or substantially similar to a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment offered for sale in
the United States.""' While "identical" is defined as "the
same as," NHTSA is strugling to define "substantial
similarity" with any clarity. In the Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking that implements the statutory
reporting requirements, NHTSA considered several sources
from which to glean guidance for a definition, from listing
examples of what NHTSA would consider "substantially
similar""' to referencing definitions of "substantially
similar" in other vehicle legislation. 2' NHTSA offered
manufacturers a rule of thumb that "the simpler an item of
equipment is, the more likely it is to be identical or
substantially similar in the United States and in foreign
markets." Considering that, even by NHTSA's own
estimation, over 14,000 items of original equipment go into
117. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
118. See TREAD Act § 3(a), 114 Stat. at 1800 (emphasis added).
119. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Record Retention, 66
Fed. Reg. 6532, 6539 (Jan. 22, 2001).
120. For example, if a vehicle manufactured outside the United States is
certified for sale in the United States and the foreign manufacturer produces
the same model (i.e., same exterior body shell and family of engines) for sale in
other countries, NHTSA would consider the vehicle "substantially similar." Id.
at 6540.
121. For example, NHTSA referenced 49 U.S.C. § 30141(a)(1)(A) of the
Vehicle Safety Act, which was added by the Imported Vehicle Safety
Compliance Act of 1988. Id. at 6540.
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current passenger cars,"' clearly NHTSA will have to define
with greater precision the parameters of the reporting
obligations, in particular as they relate to foreign
manufacturers.
To define these provisions with greater precision,
NHTSA should develop a defined process and specific
guidelines for identifying "substantially similar" vehicles.
NHTSA already accurately recognizes that the increasing
globalization of the automotive industry in the past decade
is likely in future years to result in the use of common
platforms and parts during the manufacturing process,
which could raise "complex issues" about the relationship of
defects in derivative vehicles and questions about whether
vehicles and equipment are "substantially similar."1"
However, the "complex issues" involved in defining
"substantially similar" have already been resolved in other
contexts. For example, under the "gray market" process,
NHTSA develops and publishes a list of vehicles that have
been determined to be "substantially similar" to United
States certified vehicles for purposes of determining
whether such vehicles may be imported into the United
States. Such a process could be used in the "early warning"
context. Accordingly, each vehicle manufacturer would be
required to submit to NHTSA annually, at the beginning of
each model year, a list of those vehicles that the
manufacturer intends to sell in countries other than the
United States and that the manufacturer has determined
are "substantially similar" to a vehicle certified for sale in
the United States. The following criteria should be used to
identify "substantially similar" vehicles: (1) same platform
and body shell; (2) same engine family; (3) same engine
displacement; and (4) compliance or "substantial
compliance" with specified safety standards. NHTSA could
review the list and work with the manufacturer to resolve
and differences before publishing the list as the final list for
the model year. If desired, NHTSA could publish this list
for public comment. Such an approach would establish both
a defined process and specific guidelines needed for legal
certainty.
122. See Advanced Notice of Proposed Rulemaking: Record Retention, 66
Fed. Reg. 6532, 6535 (Jan. 22, 2001).
123. See id. at 6540.
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The Senate approach to global reporting relied chiefly
on the United States entering into international
agreements.24 Specifically, the Senate version would have
authorized and requested the President to initiate
negotiations, within sixty days of enactment, for an
international agreement governing the recall by
manufacturers of motor vehicles or motor vehicle
equipment with safety-related defects.125 The purpose of
such an international agreement would be to foster "global
transparency" with regard to recalls of motor vehicles and
motor vehicle equipment to promote "consumer safety and
to enhance consumer confidence."2 6 To this end, the bill
identified certain provisions that should be incorporated
into a negotiated agreement, including provisions that
would: (1) encourage the signatory nations to identify a
responsible governmental authority for recalls; (2) foster
open communication on recalls between the signatories; and
(3) establish a website in each nation to convey information
about recalls.'27 Finally, the Senate version also authorized
DOT to cooperate with similar agencies in foreign countries
"to enhance motor vehicle and traffic safety by exchanging
information with those authorities related to motor vehicle
and motor vehicle equipment safety defects and
noncompliance." 28 Although some limited language in the
Senate version appeared to protect confidential
information, it should be noted that the issue of protecting
confidential information abroad, including valuable trade
secrets, would have been extremely difficult had the bill
actually passed; how NHTSA would have guaranteed that a
foreign government protected information deemed
"confidential" under U.S. law remained unclear.
b. Early Warning Requirements. The TREAD Act
amends the Vehicle Safety Act to direct NHTSA to complete
124. See S. 3059, 106th Cong. §§ 2-3 (2000).
125. See id. § 3. The Senate version did not, however, call for the President
to utilize the World Trade Organization ("WTO") for a multilateral trade
agreement. See id. A multilateral trade agreement could offer the advantage of
having numerous countries agreeing on common safety standards. For a
general discussion of the WTO, see Kevin M. McDonald, The Unilateral
Undermining of Conventional International Trade Law via Section 301,
7 DETROIT J. INT'L L.. & PRAc. 395 (1998).
126. S. 3059, § 3(b).
127. Id. § 3(c).
128. See id. § 2.
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a rulemaking no later than June 30, 2002, to establish early
warning reporting requirements for vehicle and vehicle
equipment manufacturers to include information on: (1)
defects; (2) injury, death, or property claims; (3) customer
satisfaction campaigns, consumer advisories, recalls, or
other relevant activities; and/or (4) incidents in the United
States where a manufacturer receives actual notice alleging
its vehicle or equipment caused fatalities or serious injuries
or, in a foreign country, where the allegedly defective
vehicle or equipment is identical or substantially similar to
that sold in the United States."9 The final rule must include
requirements for manufacturers to report, periodically or
upon request by NHTSA, information that the
manufacturer has in its possession that would help identify
defects in motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment safety
in the United States. ° In addition, NHTSA appears at first
glance to have received carte blanche to also include
"additional reporting requirements that [NHTSA]
determines are necessary to identify defects related to
vehicle and equipment safety in the United States."13'
However, only at first glance may NHTSA require
anything it desires. Before requiring any new reporting
obligations, NHTSA "must specify in its final rule how it
will review and utilize such reports to help identify defects
related to motor vehicle safety, what systems and processes
it will employ or establish to review and utilize such
information, and the manner and form in which
manufacturers are required to report."3 ' Even supporters of
the bill agreed that NHTSA does not have a "fishing
license." "' For example, Congressman Billy Tauzin (D-La.),
129. See Pub. L. No. 106414, § 3(b), 114 Stat. 1800, 1801-02 (2000) (to be
codifed at 49 U.S.C. § 30166). This requirement arose out of an en bloc
amendment offered by Congressman Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.) and passed on a
voice vote during the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and
Consumer Protection markup. See Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD, supra
note 78.
130. See TREAD Act § 3(b), 114 Stat. at 1801-02; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
954, at 13 (2000).
131. See TREAD Act § 3(b), 114 Stat. at 1801-02; ef S. 3059, § 11.
132. See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 13-14 (2000). Strikingly, no such limiting
language appeared either in the Senate version or in the Senate report
accompanying the bill. See S. 3059; S. REP. No. 106-423, at 7 (2000).
133. See Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD, supra note 78 (quoting
Congressman Cliff Stearns (R-Fla.), who offered the "early warning"
amendment to the TREAD Act).
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Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
which authored the bill, went on record saying, "[NHTSA]
must show how the information could be stored, how it will
be utilized, [and] how it will be processed and
interpreted."'34
Further limits on NHTSA include the statutory
requirements in the TREAD Act that any new reporting
obligations (1) not require manufacturers "to maintain or
submit records not in the manufacturer's possession" 5 and
(2) not impose requirements that are "unduly burdensome
to a manufacturer... taking into account the
manufacturer's cost of complying with such requirements
and the Secretary's ability to use the information sought in
a meaningful manner to assist in the identification of
defects related to motor vehicle safety."'36 The issue of
"possession" is of particular interest to automobile
manufacturers. Should NHTSA define "possession" to
include "constructive possession," as opposed to "actual
possession," information housed abroad or with the
numerous foreign distributors and importers could be
deemed to be in the "possession" of the manufacturer and
thus reportable to NHTSA, which would run contrary to
basic principles of corporate and agency law, thereby
defeating a major purpose of establishing separate legal
entities to conduct business.
As a final consideration, NHTSA should place early
warning requirements in a vehicle context, because most
defects and other field concerns are highly application
specific. In other words, many defects and other field
concerns manifest themselves only under certain conditions
stemming from the general operating environment and
134. Id.
135. This is in stark contrast to the Senate version, which would have
required DOT (i.e., NHTSA) to establish increased reporting and record
retention requirements for manufacturers. See S. 3059, § 6. Specifically, the
Senate bill mandated that NHTSA require manufacturers to "collect and report
to [NHTSA] periodically, or upon request... accidents or incidents, or trends or
patterns of accidents or incidents, involving motor vehicles [or] motor vehicle
equipment,.... [amny 3 or more lawsuits in which the manufacturer is a
defendant involving a substantially similar, alleged defect" and all information
relating to "recalls .... [and] warranty or adjustment data received by the
manufacturer." Id.
136. See TREAD § 3(b), 114 Stat. at 1801-02; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954,
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application. For example, certain high load operating
conditions that a pickup truck experiences may cause the
transmission fluid temperature to exceed the melting point
of materials used in the connector that joins the fluid line to
the transmission. If the same fluid line is also used in a
passenger car, where the fluid line never sustains the same
high load and high temperature operation, then no melting
may occur. Forcing vehicle manufacturers to generate
automatic reports in such a case is not only non-productive
and potentially misleading as an early indicator of safety-
related defects, but also runs contrary to guidelines
established in the House Committee Report, namely, that
some connection to vehicle safety be established before
mandating information reporting. Therefore, TREAD
reports about original equipment sh6uld be made in the
context of the vehicle.
In the end, the primary differences between pre-TREAD
Act and post-TREAD Act reporting are likely to be in the
mechanisms and amount of information reported. Under
the TREAD Act, information that otherwise might not have
been reported by the manufacturer unless requested by
NHTSA will now be generated periodically.
The major challenges facing NHTSA in its final
rulemaking pursuant to the early warning mandate will
include: (1) obtaining appropriate information in an
efficient and useful format; (2) adopting objective
requirements that clearly define all of the terms that are
being used for the various types of information being
considered; and (3) establishing manageable thresholds for
reporting of certain information, such as warranty and field
reports, to avoid overwhelming its already overstretched
capacities.
c. Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tire.
Under pre-TREAD law, when a manufacturer of a motor
vehicle or replacement equipment notified a dealer
(including a retailer of motor vehicle equipment) that a new
motor vehicle or new item of replacement equipment either
does not comply with a safety standard or contains a safety-
related defect, then the dealer could not sell or lease the
noncompliant or defective vehicle or equipment unless the
defect was remedied or the recall order was restrained in a
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court order. 3 ' However, prior to passage of the TREAD Act,
this sale and lease prohibition did not apply to the sale or
lease of used vehicles or equipment. During the Ford-
Firestone congressional hearings, media reports indicated
that some persons were selling defective Firestone ATX or
Wilderness AT tires that had been returned to dealers for
replacement tires under the ongoing safety recall.3 8
Although Congress chose not to explicitly ban such sales,
the TREAD Act imposes a new reporting requirement.'39
Pursuant to this new reporting requirement, the
TREAD Act directs NHTSA to issue a final rule within
ninety days of enactment (i.e., by February 1, 2001)
requiring any person, who knowingly and willfully sells or
leases a defective or noncompliant tire with actual
knowledge that the-tire manufacturer has notified dealers
of the defect, to report such sale or lease to NHTSA. The
House Commerce Committee intends the phrase
"knowingly and willfully" to "represent the common and
traditional meaning of those words involving actual
knowledge and willful action, as opposed to including any
facet of reckless disregard."' The reporting obligation
drops if the defect or noncompliance is remedied before the
sale or lease, or if the recall order is restrained or set aside
in a civil action.'
On December 26, 2000, NHTSA issued an interim final
rule pursuant to this TREAD requirement.' On July 23,
2001, NHTSA issued its final rule (effective August 22,
2001), which did not differ materially from the interim final
rule.' NHTSA concluded that "any person who knowingly
and willfully sells or leases for use on motor vehicle a
defective tire" must report within five working days to
NHTSA pursuant to the above reporting obligation."
137. See 49 U.S.C. § 30210(i) (1994).
138. See Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,409, 81,410 (Dec. 26, 2000) (interim final rule).
139. See TREAD Act § 3(c), 114 Stat. at 1802-03 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 30166).
140. See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 14.
141. See TREAD Act § 3(c), 114 Stat. at 1802-03.
142. See Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65
Fed. Reg. 81,409 (Dec. 26, 2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 573).
143. See Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66
Fed. Reg. 38,159 (July 23, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 573).
144. Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65
Fed. Reg. at 81,409-10. NHTSA chose five working days so as to be consistent
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NHTSA expects this rule to "generally apply to tire
retailers, including individuals."" Accordingly, car dealers
are not subject to these particular reporting requirements
of this rule, except with respect to tires that the car dealers
may sell or lease separately from the vehicle.
NHTSA views the principle of respondeat superior as
applying to this rule, "such that employers, principals, and
other persons who are legally accountable for the actions of
their employees or agents are required to report any
covered sales or leases that their employees or agents cause
while acting within the scope of their employment."'46 For
example, if an employee of a tire retailer sells or leases a
defective tire or fails to otherwise comply with a tire safety
standard, then both the employee and the tire retailer
would have to report the sale within five working days to
NHTSA, and both would be accountable if the sale was not
reported.'
d. Insurance Study. The TREAD Act directs NHTSA
within 120 days after enactment (i.e., by March 1, 2001) to
study the feasibility and utility of obtaining aggregate
information from insurance companies regarding claims
made for private passenger automobile accidents. 4 NHTSA
has obtained some claims information on an informal basis
for a limited number of insurance companies in the past.
However, those insurance companies have supplied most of
that information in response to specific requests from
NHTSA, as opposed to providing the information on a
regular basis as an "early warning" of possible safety
problems. Indeed, some insurance companies have refused
in the past to provide NHTSA with information requested
as part of an investigation.
To understand why insurance data is of such interest to
NHTSA, one must first appreciate how NHTSA conducts its
with 49 C.F.R. § 573.5, which requires defect and noncompliance reports to be
submitted within a five day time frame. Reporting the Sale or Lease of
Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,160.
145. Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 65
Fed. Reg. at 81,411.
146. Reporting the Sale or Lease of Defective or Noncompliant Tires, 66
Fed. Reg. at 38,160. However, only one report per covered sale or lease is
required, such that either an employee or their employer could file a report
pursuant to the new rule. Id.
147. Id.
148. Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 3(d), 114 Stat. 1800, 1803 (2000).
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investigations. Safety-related defects investigations,
conducted by NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation
(ODI), are initiated based on the information available to
NHTSA. In most cases, ODI opens an investigation based
on increased reports indicating an increased trend in
incidents. Vehicle owners, consumers, fleet managers, etc.
file these types of reports with NHTSA in various ways.
Approximately 70% of the investigations opened by ODI are
based on these reports.'49 However, to file a report the
person experiencing the incident must be aware of NHTSA
and its mission, know how to contact NHTSA, and be
willing to expend the effort and often headaches necessary
to file the report. Despite ODI's public outreach efforts to
make the public aware of NHTSA and to encourage
consumers to report defects, in particular through NHTSA's
website, ODI estimates that only a small portion of the
incidents that occur that might be related to a potential
safety-related defect are ever reported to NHTSA."5
However, insurance companies regularly receive reports
of crashes or fires involving insured vehicles that, at a
minimum, involve property damage. Also, a vehicle owner
typically files his or her first report to the insurance
company because the owner's first need is to recover costs
for the repair or replacement of the vehicle or to cover
medical expenses. Based on these facts, Congress (through
the TREAD Act) and NHTSA view insurance data as a rich
source of data that could provide "more timely identification
of emerging trends in crashes or fires that may be caused
by safety-related defects in motor vehicles or equipment." 5'
NHTSA asked the following insurance agencies to
respond to questions about how they collect claims data,
including electronic data subrogation, unusual claims rates,
and data clearing houses: Allstate Insurance Co., Farmers'
Insurance Co., GEICO General, Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., The Progressive Corp., State Farm Insurance Co., and
United Services Automobile Association (USAA). In
addition, a collaborative collection of four insurance
associations and the Insurance Institute for Highway
149. NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADI~N., TREAD ACT SECTION 3(D)
INSURANCE STUDY, § III (2001), available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/





Safety's Highway Loss Data Institute responded to
NHTSA's published request for comments.
Although an in-depth analysis of NHTSA's Insurance
Study is beyond the scope of this article, the results can be
summarized roughly as follows: (1) Although the
information that insurance companies could provide might
be useful to NHTSA, most of the insurance companies do
not have the capacity and personnel to collect and
synthesize the information. Moreover, even if an insurance
company maintained such information, data analysis would
be required, which involves human judgment, suggesting
that the raw data would be of no use to NHTSA. (2) Data
provided to clearing houses do not contain causation or
subsystem failure information, so the information may not
be useful in identifying potential defects. (3) Insurers are
concerned about providing NHTSA with personal
information that reveals the names of policyholders without
their consent that would violate the Privacy Act of 1974. (4)
Although insurers could provide data in the form of
subrogated claims, i.e., where an insurer has received a
payment for a particular claim from a third party, which
could indicate trends establishing possible safety-related
defects, this data would likely have limited value because
(a) they contain information on subrogated claims that have
already been paid; (b) there are no data on subrogated
claims that have been made but rejected, and (c) they do not
identify third parties who paid the claim.
3. Extension of Time for No-Charge Remedies. The
TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to extend the
time period during which manufacturers must provide a
cost-free remedy to consumers for any safety-related defect
or noncompliance.'52 For motor vehicles and replacement
equipment other than tires, Congress extended the time
period from eight to ten years; for tires, Congress extended
the time period from three to five years.5 3 The time period
is measured from the time of first sale to the time that
either the manufacturer or NHTSA determines the
existence of such defect or noncompliance. 154
152. See TREAD Act § 4, 114 Stat. at 1803 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C.
30120(g)(1)).
153. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 14 (2000).
154. See TREAD Act § 3, 114 Stat. at 1800-03; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
954, at 14.
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The time extension is due at least in part to Jacques
Nasser's acquiescence before Congress. 5' How this
particular amendment effectuates any of the stated
purposes of the TREAD Act remains unclear. After all,
Congress passed the TREAD Act so as to expedite reporting
of defects and noncompliances. 6 Nevertheless, both Houses
of Congress saw fit to extend the time periods."7 The
burden on manufacturers can not be accurately measured
yet, but having to remedy products a decade old, when
replacement parts may no longer be in stock and even
produced any more, may prove to be quite costly to the
manufacturers and ultimately the consumers, who will then
bear the burden through increased prices and shareholders,
who will bear the burden through reduced dividend payouts
and reduced share value.
4. Increased Penalties. Frustration with the perceived
malfeasance by top management at Ford and Firestone
generated calls for increased penalties; indeed, some "safety
advocates" even urged Congress to establish penalties with
no ceilings.' Congress responded to these calls by
increasing both civil and criminal penalties for violations of
the Vehicle Safety Act, albeit with ceilings and a "safe
harbor" limitation.
a. Civil and Criminal Penalties. Based at least in part
on Jacques Nasser's acquiescence before Congress,5 9 the
TREAD Act increases the civil penalties that NHTSA may
assess for violations of the Vehicle Safety Act from $1000
for each violation to $5000 for each violation.6 ' In addition,
the civil penalties for a related series of violations was
increased from $800,000 to $15,000,000.' The TREAD Act
also imposes new civil penalties for violating any of
155. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
157. The Senate bill provided for the same extensions. See S. 3059, 106th
Cong. § 6 (2000); see also S. REP. No. 106-423, at 7 (2000).
158. See supra note 66.
159. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
160. Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 5(a), 114 Stat. 1800, 1803-04 (2000) (to be
codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 30165(a) (civil penalties), 30170 (criminal penalties)).
161. Id. These requirements came as a result of amendments offered by
Congressman W.J. "Billy" Tauzin (D-La.), Chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection. See
Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD, supra note 78.
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NHTSA's reporting requirements under 49 U.S.C. § 30166
(including the new early warning reporting
requirements), 1"2 with maximum penalties of $5000 per
violation per day, with a maximum of $15,000,000 for a
related series of daily violations.
In addition to the amended and newly introduced civil
penalties, the TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to
provide for criminal liability where a person violated
reporting requirements with the intention of misleading
NHTSA with respect to safety-related defects in motor
vehicles or motor vehicle equipment that have caused death
or serious bodily injury.163
The new criminal provisions supplement, indeed
perhaps overlap, current law. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1001,
it is a crime punishable by up to five years in jail and by
fines up to $250,000 for individuals and $500,000 for
corporations for any person "in any matter within the
jurisdiction" of the federal government to "knowingly and
willfully"" (1) falsify, conceal, cover up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact; or (2) make any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or
representation; or (3) make or use any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially
false, fictitious, or fraudulent information.
16 5
If a person in fact so acts, with the specific intention of
misleading NHTSA with respect to motor vehicle or motor
vehicle safety-related defects that have caused death or
grievous bodily harm to an individual, then that person is-
pursuant to the TREAD Act's new criminal provisions-
subject to criminal penalties as set forth under Title 18, or
imprisonment for not more than fifteen years (ten years
more than the maximum under 18 U.S.C. § 1001), or both.'66
Title 18 seems to cover exactly what the new TREAD Act's
provisions cover, namely, sanctioning intentional lying to
NHTSA. According to NHTSA, the new TREAD Act
162. For a discussion of the new reporting requirements, see supra notes
108-45 and accompanying text.
163. See TREAD Act § 5(b), 114 Stat. at 1803-04; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
954, at 14 (2000).
164. The House Committee noted in its report that it did "not believe that
the knowingly and willful requirement of section 1001 of title 18 could or should
be construed to include reckless disregard." See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15.
165. 18 U.S.C. 1001(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
166. See TREAD Act §5(b), 114 Stat. at 1803-04.
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criminal provision presupposes a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1001.'1' Finally, the additional criminal penalties will be
charged against a person by the Attorney General only
upon request by NHTSA.'68
To summarize, the TREAD Act amends the Vehicle
Safety Act to provide for criminal liability where (1) a
person or corporation (2) violates the new reporting
requirements (3) with the intent of misleading NHTSA (4)
regarding safety-related defects in motor vehicles or motor
vehicle equipment that (5) have caused death or serious
bodily injury. All the elements must be met.
b. Safe Harbor. The TREAD Act includes a "safe
harbor" provision that offers protection from criminal
prosecution where a person corrects any improper reports
or failures to report within a "reasonable time."169 What
constitutes a "reasonable time" was left by Congress for
NHTSA to define. 1'7 0 After first suggesting twenty-one days
in an interim final rule as the "reasonable time period,'
NHTSA decided upon thirty days in the final rule. 2 In first
suggesting twenty-one days, NHTSA considered the
following factors: (1) NHTSA's mission under the Vehicle
Safety Act "to collect complete and accurate information in
order to decide whether to open investigations of potential
defects, to conduct those investigations efficiently and
expeditiously, and to assure appropriate oversight of
ongoing recalls"; (2) "real world" considerations, i.e., to
encourage the use of the safe harbor provision, the time
period must be long enough for the provision to be usable in
167. See Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,380,
38,382 (July 24, 2001) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 578) ("[The TREAD Act
criminal provision includes the predicate violation of 18 U.S.C. 1001, which has
a 'knowingly and willfully' standard.") (emphasis added).
168. See TREAD Act § 5(b); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15.
169. See TREAD Act § 5(b).
170. See id. (within ninety days of the TREAD Act's enactment, "the
Secretary [NHTSA] shall establish by regulation what constitutes a reasonable
time for [the safe harbor provision] and what manner of correction is sufficient
for purposes [of the safe harbor]"). Nevertheless, the House Commerce
Committee expected NHTSA to define a "reasonable time" as "some point after
the person is aware that a defect or noncompliance related to the falsified or
concealed information exists and that the defect or noncompliance has caused
serious bodily injury." See H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15.
171. See Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,414 (Dec.
26, 2000) (interim final rule).
172. See Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,382.
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real world situations; and (3) comparable safe harbor rules
and policies used by other federal agencies, such as the
EPA, IRS, and FAA.1
3
However, comments submitted by the Motor and
Equipment Manufacturers Association (MEMA) and the
Original Equipment Suppliers Association (OESA) on the
twenty-one day period caused NHTSA to reconsider. MEMA
and OESA argued that, because of the "wide disparities in
size, sophistication and legal support among motor vehicle
and vehicle parts manufacturers," a smaller industry
company would need more than twenty-one days to consult
with legal counsel about the implications of submitting the
corrected information and admitting a felony violation. 4
Although not persuaded by MEMA and OESA's reasoning,
NHTSA nevertheless extended the time period to thirty
calendar days. According to NHTSA, although "[twenty-
one] days ordinarily would be a sufficient time for violators
to correct their improper actions, [NHTSA was] willing to
make reasonable accommodations in light of concerns of
small businesses."'75 The thirty day period will run from
the date of the improper report to NHTSA or the date of the
failure to report to NHTSA. 76 The safe harbor is apparently
intended to apply only to the newly added (TREAD § 5(b))
criminal penalties.77
In addition to correcting the information within the
thirty day time period, to qualify for the safe harbor
173. Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81,415.
174. See Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 66 Fed. Reg. at 38,382.
175. See id.
176. Id. In order for the correction to be timely, it must be received by
NHTSA on or before the thirtieth calendar day, not merely mailed or otherwise
sent before that day. See Criminal Penalty Safe Harbor Provision, 65 Fed. Reg.
at 81,416. The correction must: (1) identify with specificity all items of
information and documents that were improper or were not provided, and (2)
correct all reporting improprieties and/or failures for which the protections of
the safe harbor provision are sought, including providing NHTSA with all
missing or corrected documents and information. Id. For a corporation to
properly make a correction, the correction (letter) must be signed by an
authorized person (ordinarily the individual officer or employee who submitted
the information and/or who should have provided missing information, or
someone in the company with authority to make such a submission). Id.
177. See CONG. REc. S10273 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen.
McCain) ("In explaining the safe harbor provision under the enhanced penalty
section, the intent of the House sponsors is not necessary because it is clear on
the face of the language that it would not apply to an underlying violation of
existing criminal law.").
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protection, the person must have lacked knowledge at the
time of the violation that the violation would result in an
accident causing death or serious bodily injury.178
c. The Senate's Approach. The Senate version
envisaged more draconian criminal sanctions. Although
anticipating the same increase in civil penalties as the
House bill, the Senate bill would have established criminal
penalties for knowingly violating provisions of the Vehicle
Safety Act that relate to compliance with the federal motor
vehicle safety standards (FMVSSs) and notification of
defects where the violation resulted in a death or
substantial injury. 17 In particular, the Senate bill would
have made it a criminal offense for a manufacturer to
knowingly place into the stream of commerce a vehicle that
fails to meet any one of the FMVSSs, or if the manufacturer
becomes aware of a defect and fails to report and a death or
injury results.8 ' The bill called for imprisonment of up to
five years when the violation resulted in serious bodily
injury, and fifteen years for violations causing death.''1
Highly problematic with the Senate version, however, was
the scope of application, because "manufacturer" was
defined to mean, inter alia, "a person manufacturing or
assembling motor vehicles or motor vehicle equipment."'82
Accordingly, any plant or factory worker who
manufacturers or assembles either automobiles or
automobile parts would have been covered by the criminal
provisions. Perhaps attempting to limit this broad scope,
the final Senate bill attached liability only to "a director,
officer, or agent of a manufacturer." Nonetheless, what
exactly an "agent of a manufacturer" would have been
defined to include remained unclear. Luckily, the courts
will be spared having to interpret these provisions. Finally,
the Senate bill envisaged no safe harbor.
178. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 5(b), 114 Stat. 1800, 1803-04 (2000).




183. See CONG. REC. S10273 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2000) (statement of Sen.
McCain) ("I am not a supporter of the safe harbor provisions.... I believe that
they create a loophole rendering the enhanced penalties meaningless, but it is
clear that they do not weaken existing law.").
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5. Acceleration of Manufacturer Remedy Program. The
TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to empower
NHTSA to force a manufacturer to "accelerate" a remedy
program if NHTSA finds that a manufacturer's remedy
program: (1) will not be completed within a "reasonable
time"; (2) that a serious injury is likely to result if the
program is not accelerated; and (3) that acceleration of the
program can be reasonably achieved by expanding the
sources of replacement parts, expanding the number of
authorized repair facilities, or both."M In addition, Congress
has now statutorily mandated that the manufacturer's
remedy program "include a plan for reimbursing an owner
or purchaser who incurred the cost of the remedy within a
reasonable time in advance of the manufacturer's
notification [requirements]. " 185 This amendment to the
Vehicle Safety Act reflects congressional frustration with
how Ford and Firestone handled the tire recall, in
particular with the (lack of) speed in which Ford and
Firestone responded to increased consumer complaints. 8 '
6. Plan to Prevent Sale of Replaced Tires. The TREAD
Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act's reporting requirements
of recalls involving tires. In particular, the manufacturer of
a tire that is the subject of a recall because of a defect or
noncompliance must now include in its remedy program a
plan
addressing how to prevent, to the extent reasonably within the
control of the manufacturer, replaced tires from being resold for
installation on a motor vehicle, and how to limit, to the extent rea-
sonable within the control of the manufacturer, the disposal of re-
placed tires in landfills, particularly through shredding, crum-
184. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 6, 114 Stat. 1800, 1804 (2000) (to be codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 30120(c)-(d)); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15 (2000).
Failure to repair a motor vehicle or replacement equipment adequately not later
than sixty days after its presentation is prima facie evidence of failure to repair
within a "reasonable time." See 49 U.S.C. § 30120(c)(2).
185. See TREAD Act § 6. NHTSA will prescribe regulations determining
what exactly constitutes "reasonable time" for purposes of this subsection. Id.
186. Considering that the Senate version in general contained more
draconian amendments to the Vehicle Safety Act, see, e.g., supra notes 179-83
and accompanying text, it is somewhat surprising to note that the Senate
version did not contain any similar language on remedy acceleration.
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bling, recyclin , 7 recovery, and other alternative beneficial non-
vehicular uses.
Thus, manufacturers of recalled tires must include in their
remedy programs a specific plan for ensuring that any
replaced tires are not resold for installation on a motor
vehicle."'
The new disposal plan requirements stopped short,
however, of mandating actual environmentally-friendly
disposal. A proposed "environmental" amendment that was
ultimately withdrawn during House Commerce Committee
markup came from Congressman Frank Pallone (D-N.J.)."9
Congressman Pallone's amendment would have required
that recalled tires not be disposed in landfills without first
being shredded or recycled. However, Congressman Brian
Bilbray (R-Cal.) properly noted that changing the tire
regulations in the Vehicle Safety Act regarding the waste
stream going into public dumps was really an
environmental matter, and Congressman Billy Tauzin (R-
La.), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection,
agreed that the House Commerce Committee did not have
the proper jurisdiction.9 '
Notwithstanding the TREAD Act, Ford promises to
recycle every tire its dealers collect from Ford's recalls. 9'
Under a comprehensive recycling plan, Ford has hired
Recovery Technologies Group, which uses a cryogenic
process to turn the tires into crumb rubber.'92 The crumb
rubber is then recycled into asphalt, rubber playground
mats, sports arena flooring, and other products."
187. See TREAD Act § 7, 114 Stat. at 1805 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §
30120(d)); see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15. The Senate version (S. 3059)
did not contain any similar requirement(s).
188. See H.R. REP. No. 106-954 at 15. The manufacturer must also include
information about the implementation of such a plan with each quarterly report
to NHTSA regarding the progress of any notification or remedy campaigns. See
TREAD § 7.
189. See supra note 79.
190. This conclusion represents an impressive display of legislative
restraint in an otherwise aggressive committee. See Steel, Commerce Committee
Approves TREAD Recall Bill, supra note 79.
191. Joe Truini, Ford Pledges to Recycle Recalled Firestone Tires,





7. Prohibition on Sales of Recalled Equipment. The
TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to now make
illegal any sale of any motor vehicle equipment (including a
tire) that is the continued subject of a recall program.194
Such a sale is allowed only if the equipment is not sold in
such a condition that it may be used for its original purpose,
unless the equipment is made no longer defective or
noncompliant, such as by modification, repair, or an
injunction of the recall.1"5 This amendment responds
directly to media reports that surfaced during congressional
testimony indicating that some persons were selling
defective Firestone ATX or Wilderness AT tires that had
been returned to dealers for replacement tires under the
ongoing safety recall.'96
8. Additional Certification Label Requirements. The
Vehicle Safety Act, even before passage of the TREAD Act
amendments, requires a manufacturer or distributor of a
motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment to certify to the
distributor or dealer at delivery that the vehicle or
equipment complies with all applicable federal motor
vehicle safety standards.'97 Certification is affected through
a label affixed to a vehicle or attached to a container of
motor vehicle equipment.9
The TREAD Act adds yet another requirement to the
certification label mandates.'99 Specifically, the TREAD Act
requires an intermediate or final stage manufacturer of a
motor vehicle that is built in more than one stage to certify
that the manufacturer has either assumed responsibility for
compliance with the standards or that it has complied with
the specifications set forth in the compliance documentation
194. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 8, 114 Stat. 1800, 1805 (2000) (to be codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 30120). This prohibition arose as a result of an amendment
offered by Congressman Gene Green (D-Tex.). See Steel, supra note 78. Note
that the Senate bill did not contain any similar requirement. See S. 3059, 106th
Cong. (2000).
195. See TREAD Act § 8; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 15-16 (2000).
196. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
197. See 49 U.S.C. § 30115 (1994).
198. Id.
199. See TREAD Act § 9, 114 Stat. at 1805 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §
30115); cf. S. 3059, § 4 (requiring testing or engineering analyses that the
vehicle or equipment complies with all applicable motor vehicle safety
standards by any person who affixes a certification label or tag to a motor
vehicle or item of motor vehicle equipment).
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provided by the incomplete motor vehicle manufacturer. 0
An intermediate or final stage manufacturer that chooses to
assume responsibility for compliance with the standard
covered by the documentation provided by an incomplete
manufacturer must notify the incomplete manufacturer
within a reasonable time of affixing the certification label.20 '
9. Endurance and Resistance Standards for Tires. The
TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to require
NHTSA to "conduct a rulemaking to revise and update the
tire standards published at 49 C.F.R. § 571.109 and 49
C.F.R. § 571.119.,202 NHTSA has until June 1, 2002 to
implement new rules.'O Considering that NHTSA had not
updated tire standards for over thirty years, this provision
was considered long overdue by almost everyone who
testified at the congressional hearings.0 4 Current tire safety
tests measure durability at varying speeds and loads for a
fixed time on a rotating drum. Many of the tests pertain to
bias ply tires, which automakers rarely fit on vehicles;
rather, automakers use radial tires. General Motors is
urging NHTSA to use real-world testing, because wheels,
suspension systems, loads, road surfaces, and other factors
affect tire durability."5 A preliminary outline issued by
NHTSA "dramatically increases the number of speed and
endurance tests.., which measure tire performance based
on load, speed, temperature, pressure, and duration."2"'
10. Improved Tire Safety Information. The TREAD Act
amends the Vehicle Safety Act to direct NHTSA within
thirty days of passage of the Act (i.e., by December 1, 2000)
to "initiate a rulemaking proceeding to improve the labeling
of tires.., to assist consumers in identifying tires" that
may be the subject of a recall.2"7 The rulemaking may also
include "whatever additional action [NHTSA deems]
200. See TREAD Act § 9; see also H.R. REP. NO. 106-954, at 16.
201. TREAD Act § 9; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 16. This new
requirement is not subject to the civil penalty provision. See id.
202. See TREAD § 10, 114 Stat. at 1805-06. The Senate version (as
introduced) contained a similar requirement. See S. 3059, § 13.
203. Id.
204. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
205. See Richard Truett, Test Tires on Road, GM Says, AUTOMOTIvE NEWS,




appropriate to ensure that the public is aware of the
importance of observing motor vehicle tire load limits and
maintaining proper tire inflation levels for the safe
operation of a motor vehicle."2 °8 Such "action may include a
requirement that the manufacturer of motor vehicles
provide the purchasers of the motor vehicles information on
appropriate tire inflation levels and load limits" if NHTSA
determines such information is the most efficient means by
which to educate consumers."'
On December 1, 2000, NHTSA issued an Advanced
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) implementing
this TREAD Act requirement.2 In this ANPRM, NHTSA
sought responses from the public to questions on matters
such as "tire identification number content, readability and
location, loading, plies and cord material, tread wear
indicators, Uniform Tire Quality Grading Standards, speed
ratings, run-flat and extended mobility tires, tire inflation
pressure, and dissemination of tire safety information.""'
Although still too early to tell specifically where NHTSA is
going with this rule, in particular because NHTSA still has
to process the answers submitted in responses to the
ANPRM, most likely the final rule will require vehicle
manufacturers to provide the purchasers of the motor
vehicles information on appropriate tire inflation levels and
load limits."2
207. See TREAD Act § 11, 114 Stat. at 1806. The Senate version (as
introduced) contained a similar requirement. See S. 3059, § 14. The bill required
NHTSA to initiate a rule:
to improve the labeling of tires . . . . to facilitate improved public
understanding of load limits and appropriate tire inflation levels. The
Secretary shall also take whatever additional action is appropriate to
ensure that the public is aware of the importance of observing motor
vehicle tire load limits and maintaining proper tire inflation levels to
the safe operation of a motor vehicle.
Id.
208. See TREAD Act § 11.
209. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 16 (2000). This requirement
arose out of an amendment offered by Congressman Bill Luther (D-Minn.),
which passed on a voice vote, to require regulations putting tire identification
information on the outer sidewalls, where the information is more accessible to
consumers. See Steel, Panel Adds Teeth to TREAD, supra note 78.
210. See Consumer Information Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 75,222 (Dec. 1,
2000) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 567, 571, 574, and 575).
211. Id. at 75,223.
212. Id.
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11. Rollover Tests. The TREAD Act amends the Vehicle
Safety Act to require NHTSA within two years of
enactment of the Act (i.e., by November 1, 2002) to "develop
a dynamic test on rollovers by motor vehicles for the
purposes of a consumer information program., 1  Rollover
testing is important because "[r]ollovers are the leading
type of fatal crashes in light trucks, a category that includes
popular [SUVs]."214 The TREAD Act also requires NHTSA to
"conduct a rulemaking to determine how best to
disseminate test results to the public." ' The rollover tests
must be designed for new motor vehicles, including
passenger cars and multipurpose passenger vehicles, that
have a gross vehicle weight rating of 10,000 pounds or
less.216
The rollover testing is due at least in part to Jacques
Nasser's acquiescence before Congress and runs contrary to
the position agreed upon by the automobile industry-at
least informally-up until that point. According to NHTSA,
the TREAD Act's rollover testing attempts to address a
concern of Consumers Union, namely, that NHTSA's
213. See TREAD Act § 12, 114 Stat. at 1806 (to be codified at 49 U.S.C. §
30117). This requirement arose out of an amendment offered by Congressman
Edward Markey (D-Mass.), ranking Democrat on the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer Protection. See Steel, supra note 78.
Note that the Senate bill did not contain any provisions on rollover testing. See
S. 3059, 106th Cong. (2000).
214. See Steel, Commerce Committee Approves TREAD Recall Bill, supra
note 79. Nevertheless, the proper role of the federal government in the area of
rollovers remains unclear. The National Academy of Sciences recently named
thirteen experts to consider the proper role of the federal government in
preventing rollovers. See Harry Stoffer, Makers Prep for Rollover Study,
AUTOMOTIvE NEWS, Apr. 9, 2001, at 8. The current "five-star" safety
measurement system used by NHTSA is based not on any test of vehicle
handling, but rather solely on measurements of each vehicle's track width and
the height of its center of gravity, which NHTSA calls the "static stability
factor." Id.
215. See Steel, Commerce Committee Approves TREAD Recall Bill, supra
note 79. As originally drafted by Congressman Markey, the test results would
have been made available to consumers before buying a new car. But
Republicans Paul Gillmor (R-Ohio) and Robert Ehrlich (R-Md.) objected to
informing consumers about rollover dangers at the "point of sale" because of
fear that car dealers would be exposed to new liability. See Steel, Panel Adds
Teeth to TREAD, supra note 78. Rather than address the issue directly,
Congressman Markey rewrote the amendment and abdicated the decision to
NHTSA. 143 CONG. REC. E1778 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
216. TREAD Act § 12, 114 Stat. at 1806. The tests 'will not apply to motor
homes. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-954, at 16 (2000).
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proposed use of Static Stability Factor ("SSF"), which is the
ratio of one half the track width of a vehicle to the center of
gravity height, as part of a consumer information ratings
system for rollover resistance of vehicles (under the
auspices of NHTSA's New Car Assessment Program
("NCAP")), should be used in conjunction with a dynamic
stability test using vehicle maneuvers to better predict the
risk of untripped vehicle rollovers.217
12. Tire Pressure Warning. The TREAD Act amends
the Vehicle Safety Act to require NHTSA within one year of
enactment of the Act (i.e., by November 1, 2001) to
"complete a rulemaking for a regulation [to become effective
within two years of such regulation] to require a warning
system in new motor vehicles to indicate to the oVerator
when a tire is significantly under inflated."2  This
requirement arose out of an amendment offered by
Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) during House
Commerce Committee consideration. According to
Congressman Markey, a tire pressure warning "could help
save lives, help conserve fuel, and prolong the integrity of
tires. 219
When NHTSA first looked at establishing a tire
pressure warning in the late 1970s, it decided the
technology was too expensive.2 ' NHTSA concluded that the
retail cost of $200 (in 1981 dollars) per vehicle for in-vehicle
warning devices could not "be justified by the potential
benefits, although those benefits might be significant."2 '
Accordingly, NHTSA terminated the tire pressure
rulemaking on August 31, 1981.222
However, congressional testimony during the Ford-
Firestone hearings from safety experts and automotive
executives, including Jacques Nasser, that motorists in the
United States needed additional assistance in becoming
aware of the tire pressure of their vehicles so that they can
217. See Request for Comments, 66 Fed. Reg. 35,179, 35,180 (July 3, 2001).
218. TREAD Act § 13, 114 Stat. at 1806. Note that the Senate bill did not
contain any provisions tire pressure warnings. See S. 3059, 106th Cong. (2000).
219. See 146 CONG. REC. E1778 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
220. Id.
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adjust the pressure periodically to insure proper inflation,
convinced Congress that the time had come to mandate
such warnings." Accordingly, Congress mandated that
NHTSA issue tire warnings on vehicles.
Fulfilling this new requirement, on July 25, 2001,
NHTSA proposed a new safety standard requiring the
installation of dashboard monitors by 2005 to warn drivers
when a tire's pressure becomes low enough to affect driving
safety.24 Specifically, the notice of proposed rulemaking
established a new federal motor vehicle safety standard
(FMVSS) number 138 that would require all new passenger
cars, light trucks, and multipurpose vehicles to have an
instrument panel light that flashes when tire pressure is
too low.
The new safety standard proposed by NHTSA is a
warning telltale that illuminates to inform the driver when
a tire on a passenger car, light truck, bus, and multipurpose
passenger vehicle (weighing 10,000 pounds or less) is
"significantly" under-inflated (defined by NHTSA as
between 20-25%). To this end, NHTSA has proposed two
alternatives.22 The first ("Alternative One") would require a
warning when the tire pressure in one or more tires-up to
four tires-falls to 20% or more below the vehicle
manufacturer's recommended cold inflation pressure, or a
minimum pressure level specified in the new standard,
whichever is higher.2 6 The second ("Alternative Two")
would require a warning when the tire pressure in one or
more tires-up to three tires-falls to 25% or more below
the vehicle manufacturer's recommended cold inflation
pressure for the vehicle's tires, or minimum pressure level
specified in the new standard, whichever is higher.22 '
223. See id. Surveys indicate that most drivers do not check their tires'
inflation pressure frequently. A recent NHTSA study showed that 71% of
drivers said they check their tires' air pressure less than once a month. See
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 66 Fed. Reg. 38,982, 38,984 (July 26, 2001).
Motorists' failure to maintain proper tire inflation and maintenance also
contributed to the Firestone tread separation problems. Under-inflation of tires
can result in tire failure, loss of tire traction (making handling more difficult),
increased rolling resistance and correspondingly decreased fuel economy. Id. at
38,985.
224. See id. at 38,982.
225. NHTSA seeks comments by September 6, 2001 from tire pressure





The two alternatives differ in several areas. First,
Alternative One would cost about $66.33 per vehicle,
whereas Alternative Two would cost about $30.54 on
vehicles already equipped with an antilock braking system
(ABS).228 Second, Alternative One requires manufacturers to
install a direct tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS),
which has a tire pressure sensor in each tire and directly
measures the pressure in a vehicle's tires."9 Alternative
Two would seem to require either the use of direct TPMSs
or indirect TPMSs. Indirect TPMSs do not have individual
tire sensors; rather, they work in conjunction with a
vehicle's ABS to detect and compare differences in the
rotational speed of a vehicle's wheels and then estimate the
pressure.23
Both alternatives would require the low tire pressure
warning telltale to illuminate within ten minutes of driving
after any tire or combination of tires on the vehicle becomes
significantly under-inflated as defined by the alternative
(20-25%).1 Both alternatives would also require the low
tire pressure warning telltale to remain illuminated as long
as any of the vehicle's tires remains significantly under-
inflated, and the ignition switch is in the "on" ("run")
position. 32
According to NHTSA, between forty-nine to seventy-
nine deaths and 6585 to 10,635 injuries could be prevented
each year if all vehicles were equipped with tire pressure
warning systems.233 The monitors could be phased in over
several years, beginning with 35% of new vehicles built
between November 1, 2003 and 2004, 65% in the second
year, and all new vehicles in the third year.
13. Improving the Safety of Child Restraints. The
TREAD Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to direct
228. See id. at 38,983, 38,987. Adding ABS and the necessary indirect TPMS
features would cost about $240 per vehicle. Id. Adding wheel speed sensors and
the necessary TPMS features would cost about $130 per vehicle. Id. at 38,987.
229. Id.
230. See id. Wheel speed correlates to tire pressure because the diameter of
a tire decreases slightly as tire pressure decreases. Id. at 38,983. Because
indirect TPMSs can not detect when all four tires simultaneously lose pressure
and become significantly under-inflated, Alternative Two requires warnings
about pressure loss in only one to three tires. Id. at 38,987.
231. Id. at 38,989.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 38,996.
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NHTSA to complete rulemakings within two years of
enactment (i.e., by November 1, 2002) to: (1) improve child
restraint safety, under which NHTSA must consider
whether to mandate from among nine separate safety,
equipment, and testing related elements in its final rule
and (2) establish a child restraints safety rating consumer
information program."4  The TREAD Act also directs
NHTSA within one year of enactment (i.e., by November 1,
2001) to: (1) complete a child booster seat study and (2)
develop a five-year strategic plan to reduce by 25% deaths
and injuries caused by failure to use correct booster seats
among four to eight year old children."
Finally, the TREAD Act requires NHTSA within twelve
months of enactment (i.e., by November 1, 2001) to "initiate
a rulemaking for the purpose of improving the safety of
child restraints, including minimizing head injuries from
side impact collisions."" This requirement, which
incorporated a measure sponsored on the Senate side by
Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald (R-Ill.), was promoted in the
House bill by Congressman John. M. Shimkus (R-Ill.).
234. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 14, 114 Stat. 1800, 1806-08 (2000). NHTSA
will consider whether to:
(1) require more comprehensive tests of child restraints using an array
of crash conditions and an updated test seat assembly; (2) use test
dummies that represent a greater range of sizes of children and that
incorporate current technologies; (3) require improved protection from
head injuries in side- and rear-impact crashes; (4) provide consumer
information on the physical compatability of child restraints and
vehicle seats on a model-by-model basis; (5) prescribe clearer and
simpler labels and instructions on child restraints; (6) consider
restraints for children weighing up to 80 pounds; (7) apply scaled
injury criteria performance levels, including neck injury; and (8)
include a child restraint in each vehicle crash tested under the New
Car Assessment Program.
Improving the Safety of Child Restraints, 66 Fed. Reg. 25,900, 25,900-01 (May
14, 2001).
235. Id. (this is a group that safety advocates consider "forgotten children,"
i.e., children who have outgrown child restraints but are too big to fit safely in
adult seat belts). Children using seat belts directly after using child safety seats
are 3.5 times more likely to sustain significant injury (4.2 times more likely for
those injuries to be head injuries) than those restrained in child safety seats or
booster seats. A proper fit consists of the lap belt fitting low over the hips of the
child and the shoulder belt crossing the shoulder and sternum, which
distributes crash forces to the stronger parts of the body. See Restraint Experts
Meet to Discuss Ways to Bolster Booster Use, NHTSA Plan, 29 Prod. Safety &
Liab. Rep. (BNA) 678 (July 16, 2001).
236. TREAD Act § 14(a), 114 Stat. at 1806. The Senate bill did not contain
any provisions on child restraints. See S. 3059, 106th Cong. (2000).
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According to Congressman Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.),
Member of the House Commerce Committee, child
restraints (also know as "child safety seats") are "often
marketed for children who are larger and heavier than the
anthropomorphic test dummies used by [NHTSA]."" The
House Commerce Committee relied heavily on a Consumer
Reports magazine article that found through independent
testing that child safety seats tested with a child at the
highest weight recommended by the manufacturer of that
product failed."8 The House added this provision dealing
specifically "to encourage NHTSA to allow child restraints
to be marketed for children at specific weights only if the
restraint has been tested at that weight, even if this means
adding weights to a dummy during testing."239 Congressman
Markey encourages NHTSA to require testing be carried
out at speeds of between 27.9 miles per hour to 30.3 miles
per hour.240 The Consumer Reports investigation found that
tests are regularly conducted at speeds as low at 27.6 miles
per hour, even though the federal motor vehicle safety
standard requires testing at an impact of thirty miles per
hour.
241
14. Improving Criteria Used in a Recall. The TREAD
Act amends the Vehicle Safety Act to require NHTSA
within thirty days of enactment of the Act (i.e., by
December 1, 2000) to "undertake a comprehensive review
... [and] undertake such steps as may be necessary to
update and improve such standards, criteria, procedures,
and methods, including data management and analysis"
used by NHTSA in determining whether to open a defect or
noncompliance investigation. 42 Within one year of
237. See 106 CoNG. REC. E1816 (daily ed. Oct. 17, 2000) (statement of Rep.
Markey).
238. Id. (citing CONSUMER REP., Jan. 1999, at 21, available at
http://www.consumerreports.orgmain/home.jsp).
239. Id. (statement of Rep. Markey).
240. See id.
241. Id. "This 3 mile per hour differential means that only 81% as much
energy is going into the crash." Id. The federal motor vehicle safety standard on
child safety seats can be found at 49 C.F.R. § 571.213 (2000).
242. See Pub. L. No. 106-414, § 15, 114 Stat. 1800, 1808 (2000); see also H.R.
REP. No. 106-954, at 17 (2000). This requirement came as a result of an
amendment offered by Congresswoman Heather Wilson (R-N.M.). See Michael
Steel, Commerce Panel Reviews TREAD Safety Bill, NAT'L J. NEWS SERV., Sept.
21, 2000, available at LEXIS, 106 Markup H.R. 5164. The Senate bill did not
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enactment (i.e., by November 1, 2001), DOT must submit a
report of its "findings and actions" to the House Committee
on Commerce and the Senate Committee on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation.
243
15. Follow-up Report. The TREAD Act requires the
NHTSA to report to Congress within one year after
enactment (i.e., by November 1, 2001) "on the
implementation of the amendments made by [the TREAD
Act] and any recommendations for additional amendments
for consumer safety."2
16. Authorization of Appropriations. Based in part on
congressional testimony lamenting an overextended staff
with underfunded resources, Congress authorized an
additional $9.1 million for the DOT and NHTSA to carry
out the TREAD Act. 245 However, Congress specified that the
DOT and NHTSA were not to spend this additional funding
"for the general administrative expenses."2 6 President
George W. Bush's budget for fiscal year 2002 includes $419
million for NHTSA's operations, an increase of 5% over
200 1.247
contain any similar provisions on mandating a review of recall standards. See S.
3059, 106th Cong. (2000).
243. TREAD Act § 15(b).
244. Id. § 16. The Senate bill did not contain any similar provision requiring
a follow-up report. See S. 3059.
245. See TREAD Act § 17, 114 Stat. at 1808-09; see also H.R. REP. No. 106-
954, at 17. The Senate bill did not authorize any additional spending. See S.
3059.
246. See TREAD Act § 17.
247. See $419 Million Provided for NHTSA in Bush's Fiscal Year 2002
Request, 24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 374 (Apr. 16, 2001). The amount
includes $196 million for operations and research, including $74 million for a
highway trust fund ($38 million of which reward states that pass new laws and
programs that attack drunk driving) and $223 million for highway traffic safety
grants. Id. at 374-75.
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Reporting Foreign Yes Yes, H.R. 5164: report recalls of
Recalls/ albeit "substantially similar vehicles or
Safety Campaigns indirectly equipment."
Early Warning Yes Yes S. 3059 envisaged duty on
Reporting manufacturer to generate and
keep certain records.
International No Yes S. 3059 envisaged international
Cooperation/Agreements agreement governing recalls.
Extension of Time for Yes Same as Vehicle & Equipment = 10 years.
No-Charge Remedies H.R. 5164 Tires = 8 years.
Increased Civil Penalties Yes Same as $5000 per violation;
H.R. 5164 $15,000,000 for series.
Increased Criminal Yes, 5-15 years S. 3059 envisaged wider scope




NHTSA Acceleration of Yes No Risk of "serious injury or death"
Mfr. Remedy Program must exist.
Tire Mfr. Plan to Yes No Recall must also include plan for
Prevent Sale of Recalled "green" disposal of replaced tires.
Tires
Prohibition on Sales of Yes No No sale unless defect remedied.
Recalled Equipment
Additional Certification Yes Yes Could affect both intermediate
Label Requirements and final stage manufacturers.
Duty on Used Car No Yes Fear of dealer and small
Dealer to Notify of business backlash kept this out of
Non-Remedied Recall H.R. 5164.
School Bus or No Yes Operators must have received
Commercial Operators notice of defect or noncompliance.
Not to Drive Recalled
Vehicle
Revised Tire Safety Yes Yes Updated 30 year-old standards.
Standards
Improved Tire Yes Yes Will likely end up on sidewalls of
Information tires.
Rollover Yes No Rollovers lead type of fatal
Tests crashes in SUVs.
Tire Pressure Warning Yes No Will be part of on-board display.
Improving Safety of Yes No More accuracy in advertising
Child Restraints weight.
Improving Criteria Used Yes No DOT to report back to Congress
in a Recall within one year.
Increased Odometer No Yes Had nothing to dow! TREAD.
Penalties III







Not for "general administrative
expenses."
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CONCLUSION
Thanks in large part to a perceived malfeasance in how
top management at Ford and Firestone handled the recall
of Firestone tires overseas vis-h-vis NHTSA, Congress put
extraordinary pressure on itself to act quickly before
heading out to the campaign trail. In only eighteen hours,
Congress passed the most wide-sweeping amendments to
the (then) thirty-five-year old Vehicle Safety Act, from new
worldwide reporting obligations to new dashboard tire
pressure monitors. By so doing, Congress affected not only
Ford and Firestone but also the entire automotive industry,
from motor vehicle manufacturers to equipment suppliers
and retail tire outlets.
The TREAD Act should not be viewed as a panacea for
the failures of Ford and Firestone. While the TREAD Act
sets higher standards for tire performance, tires will
continue to fail. Even with all the additional statutory
requirements and ensuing regulations, consumers, who
remain ultimately responsible for ensuring proper tire
inflation, will continue to neglect checking their tires for
proper inflation. The TREAD Act stopped short of requiring
that consumers actually check their own tires for proper air
inflation.
As NHTSA undertakes to complete its numerous
rulemakings in fulfillment of the TREAD Act, certain
questions must be answered in its follow-up report to
Congress, such as: (1) What systems has NHTSA put into
place to respond to increased streams of data required to be
submitted by manufacturers? (2) How effective are these
systems in accurately and reliably identifying trends
pointing to safety-related defects? (3) How effective are the
revised tire safety standards and improved tire information
in preventing customer abuse in caring for tires? (4) What
information has proven to not be helpful in identifying
trends pointing to safety-related defects? (5) What has the
cost been to manufacturers, and ultimately, consumers and
shareholders to comply with the TREAD Act's amendments
and NHTSA's rulemaking? (6) How effective has NHTSA
been in balancing the public's right to know certain
information versus the manufacturer's need to protect
legitimate trade secrets?
Whether additional congressional intervention will
determine what caused the failure of Firestone tires on
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Ford Explorers is highly doubtful. Congressman Billy
Tauzin, otherwise a conservative Republican, has shown a
surprising willingness to launch the federal government, in
particular the House Commerce Committee, into a complex
arena of engineering issues for which specialized experts at
NHTSA, not amateur congressional staffers, were trained
to solve. Tauzin's several high-profile hearings generated no
specific answers to the complex issues of tread separation
and rollovers. It is highly doubtful that additional hearings
will generate any specific answers, either.
Although the impact of the TREAD Act on industry will
be felt gradually as NHTSA completes its numerous
rulemakings, the thrust behind the TREAD Act can be felt
already. In announcing the "follow-up" recall of the
Firestone Wilderness AT tires in May 2001, Ford said it
was guided at least in part by underlying principles of the
TREAD Act, in particular principles of early warning
reporting. A day before, Firestone severed a ninety-five-
year-old business relationship with Ford because Firestone
disagreed with Ford's interpretation of safety data. Perhaps
Ford and Firestone also disagreed on how to interpret the
principles underlying the TREAD Act. Hopefully, this
article has helped to clarify at least some of these
principles.
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